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 During the 1960’s Guatemalan stability began to falter due to a political and 
social breakdown; guerilla violence and government repression emerged from this 
decade as common occurrences. In response to the instability within Guatemala, the US 
focused on providing significant financial aid to bolster a weak economy, while 
simultaneously working with the Guatemalan police and military to create more efficient 
and modern internal security forces capable of combating Communist subversion. 
Despite US attempts to foster stability, in 1963 President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes was 
removed from office by a military coup organized by his opponents within Guatemala.  
 The Lyndon B. Johnson administration continued to support the Guatemalan 
government and continued to provide economic and military assistance. Despite US 
assistance, the internal social and political divisions in Guatemala continued to result in 
violence. In the midst of the escalating violence, elections were held in 1966 and the 
center left candidate Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro was elected as the new president 
of Guatemala. The election of a politically left president further radicalized the 
Guatemalan right, which resulted in attempted coups and acts of terror. The violence 
from the leftist guerillas and the radical rightist elements forced Mendez Montenegro to 
 iv 
allow the military to use harsh counter-terror strategies to bring the country under 
control. Despite negative developments, the US consistently tried to help build 
Guatemalan stability. Unfortunately, its policies ignored the socio-economic inequalities, 
and internal division which was the biggest problem facing the nation. The internal 
political division that created the violence and instability made it impossible for any US 
assistance to have a meaningful impact. During the 1960’s these developments in 
Guatemala paved the way for the violence and genocide of the 1980’s and solidified a 
policy of US involvement that was inadequate and ineffective.  
 v 
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 Guatemala sits atop Central America at the southern tip of Mexico. A country 
slightly smaller than Tennessee, marked by volcanoes and lush tropical jungles along the 
Pacific coastline, to the north the mountainous highlands reach nearly 4,000 meters into 
the sky. Within this landscape, there is a large indigenous population with a rich culture 
and history. Nevertheless, the natural beauty of Guatemala disguises the important fact 
that under an attractive landscape, problems abound. During the last half of the 20th 
century, Guatemala was in a continuous state of crisis. Starting in 1954 with a military 
coup, rebellions, assassinations, guerilla warfare, state-sponsored mass murder, and 
political chaos became the norm in Guatemalan society and politics. Only in the 1990’s 
did a small measure of peace and stability develop. From 1960 to 1996, 200,000 
Guatemalan citizens died. While there was state-sponsored violence and upheaval in 
many parts of Latin America during the 20th century, the Guatemalan “Violencia” was 
the worst.1  
 This period of violence was inaugurated in 1954 by a coup against Jacobo 
Arbenz the legitimate President of Guatemala aided by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). That coup more than any other subject in Guatemalan history has received 
extensive attention from US scholars. The events that followed this period, however, 
                                                
This thesis follows the style of the journal Diplomatic History. 
 
1 The death count is generally agreed on by most of the authors, fluctuating from 100,000 to 250,000 
casualties, the 200,000 death statistic is verified by the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification, Guatemala Memory of Silence: report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, 
conclusions and recommendations, http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html (accessed 
February 27, 2011). 
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have yet to be examined in detail. This thesis will examine many of the important early 
events of what has been called the Guatemalan Civil War. The roots of the conflict 
clearly lay with the 1954 coup and the inequalities in Guatemalan society; however 
during the 1960’s guerilla movements emerged, military control over the government 
became highly visible, and counter-revolutionary groups became major political actors. 
This thesis will also explore the issue of US-Guatemalan relations during the 1960’s, in 
particular US financial aid, military assistance, and training. During the hottest period of 
the Cold War, when Latin America was receiving the most attention, Guatemala, a 
nation the US had already invested in through intervention, received only the minimum 
of assistance and action necessary to maintain a pro-US government in power. The 
ineffectiveness of US assistance in helping build a stronger Guatemalan economy and 
more stable nation was shocking considering the fear of communist takeover in Latin 
America. Yet, the example of Guatemala exposes the realities of US-Latin American 
relations during the Cold War better then more extreme examples, like Cuba, Chile, and 
Brazil. The following pages will lay the groundwork for the rest of the thesis by 
describing the historical background of the region and Guatemala itself. 
*** 
 The story of modern Guatemala began with the Latin American republics gaining 
independence from Spain. The Kingdom of Guatemala was composed of the modern 
countries Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. Before 
independence from Spain, this region was loosely under the control of the viceroyalty of 
New Spain. The Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru were the colonial centers for the 
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Spaniards. The Kingdom of Guatemala was far removed from those areas and had no 
major population centers, no gold, silver, or sugar, it was not until coffee and bananas 
became popular that Guatemala had a successful resource to export. It had therefore 
attracted fewer Spanish settlers and the indigenous population and mestizos had a greater 
role in society than in other regions of Latin America. The greater percentage of 
indigenous peoples created a situation where the majority of the population were limited 
in their political and social power. The division between those of Indian and Spanish 
descent would continue through the 20th century. In January of 1822, Central America 
gained freedom from Spanish rule but was incorporated into the Mexican empire. 
Brigadier General Vicente Filisola and his army used military force to solidify Mexican 
control over Central America, but in March of 1823 Emperor Agustin I was overthrown 
and Filisola called for a Central American congress. After a brief period of turmoil, the 
congress met in Guatemala City on June 24th 1823 and formed a federal government. 
However, the Conservative and Liberal ideological conflict caused a breakdown in 
government and a civil war that lasted from 1826-1829. The Liberal Party emerged from 
the conflict in power with Francisco Morazán leading the Central American Federation.2 
The federation gradually fell apart due to internal pressure. By 1840 it had ceased to 
exist.3   
                                                
2  Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure Of Union (Chapel Hill, 1961), is a good summary of the events 
surrounding the independence period and a frequently cited work in English. Alberto Herrarte, La Union 
De Centro America (Guatemala, 1963) is also a good broad survey of the major events. 
3 Unlike many areas of study, there is no one classic summary of Guatemalan history. The following are 
good concise summaries of Central American history, Edelberto Torres Rivas, History, and Society in 
Central America (Austin, 1993); Hector Perez-Brignoli, A Brief History of Central America (Berkeley, 
1985).  
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 Rafael Carrera, the nation’s first caudillo, overthrew Francisco Morazán and the 
Central American Federation shortly after independence from Spain.4 Following the 
collapse of the Central American Federation, the modern nations of Central America 
emerged, and began the arduous process of forming and maintaining national 
governments. In Guatemala, this took the form of dictatorial rule. For a brief period after 
Carrera’s death in 1865, there was the possibility of democratic elections, but in 1871 
Justo Rufino Barrios who represented the Liberal political party took control and would 
hold onto power until 1885. After another brief period of transition when the presidency 
shifted between several weak presidents for 13 years, Manuel Estrada Cabrera took over 
from 1898-1920.  
 Estrada Cabrera’s role in creating strong national ties with the United Fruit 
Company (UFCO) was of particular importance. The interest of US companies in 
Central America had a profound economic impact on Guatemala. This powerful 
influence began to develop around 1870 with the rise of Liberals to political power. And 
at this time Central American countries began to develop export-oriented economies. 
The growth of US business in Central America was linked to two specific commodities 
industries coffee, and bananas. Through various US companies’ these commodities were 
exported to the United States, yet in order to do this effectively and on a large scale 
many companies became powerful political forces in their own right, influencing 
national policies and building infrastructure.  
                                                
4  Ralph Lee Woodward Jr., Rafael Carrera and The Emergence Of The Republic Of Guatemala 1821-
1871 (Athens, 1993), is a thorough biography of Guatemala’s first dictator.  
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 The case of Guatemala exemplifies US foreign policy in Central America and the 
Caribbean. During the first half of the 20th century, US-Latin American relations were 
dominated by business interests in the region. President Taft’s “Dollar Diplomacy” set 
forth the policy that it was better to try and influence Latin America through loans and 
foreign investment rather then outright intervention. Through these businesses the fate of 
both North and South America became intertwined. As Paul Dosal describes in Doing 
Business with the Dictators US corporations like UFCO became integrated into the 
social structure of Central America. Not only was UFCO the largest employer in 
Guatemala it was also the largest private landowner. Through its connections with the 
regimes of Estrada Cabrera and Jorge Ubico (1931-1944) the corporation exerted 
significant political influence to its own advantage, this interaction was mirrored 
throughout the region. In Honduras, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, US 
business and policies shaped these young nations. In the Caribbean and Central America 
US business and national governments developed intimate ties, each aiding the other in 
the process of maintaining power over the region. The United Fruit Company, Standard 
Fruit, as well as other less powerful companies shaped a Central American economic 
system based upon dependency.5  
 US-Latin American relations in the early 20th century were also shaped by 
military intervention. While “Dollar Diplomacy” was supposed to emphasize economics, 
US marines were still deployed throughout the Caribbean and Central America. In 1912 
marines were deployed to Nicaragua in order to help maintain a favorable government. 
                                                
5  Paul J. Dosal, Doing Business With The Dictators: a political history of United Fruit in Guatemala, 
1899-1944 (Wilmington, 1993), P.1-13. 
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In 1916 marines landed in the Dominican Republic to instill order and put an end to the 
political upheaval the nation was experiencing. In contrast to these examples, Guatemala 
was one of the few nations that did not experience a military intervention during the 
early 20th century. This was due primarily to the fact that dictatorial control of the 
country and foreign businesses interests were never challenged. The strength of 
conservative institutions and elite control in Guatemala was stronger then in any other 
country in the region; those institutions maintained the status quo while other nations 
were growing and developing. Guatemala never had to deal with the inevitable upheaval 
that follows change, and remained stable during the first half of the 20th century. World 
War One further integrated the Latin American economies into a world system. However 
due to the increased integration, when the world economy collapsed in the Great 
Depression so too did the economies of Latin America. Jorge Ubico was the last of the 
traditional caudillos to control Guatemala. The long domination of Guatemala by 
internal elites and foreign companies was supposed to end in 1944 with the overthrow of 
Ubico and the subsequent election of President Juan Jose Arevelo, who began a ten-year 
period of democratic reform.6  
*** 
 An important historical reality that shaped Guatemalan history throughout these 
events and into the 20th century was internal social and political division. A relatively 
small class of elites rose to power in the 19th century. The conservative elites dominated 
society and politics, while the rest of the population was marginalized. Nineteen of the 
                                                
6  Don M. Coerver and Linda B. Hall, Tangled Destinies: Latin America and the United States 
(Albuquerque, 1999), is an excellent overview of US Latin American relations. 
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twenty leading families in Guatemala became prominent in the 1800’s and remained in 
positions of power through the 20th century.7 The success of a small number of elite 
families early in the history of this nation established a precedent of elite control. The 
distribution of land and wealth was extremely unequal in Guatemala. In 1950, 2% of the 
landowners controlled 70% of the country’s farmland. The control of land was of 
particular importance because Guatemala was a predominantly rural society. During the 
1960’s over 65% of the population was actively involved in agriculture.8 Because of the 
unequal distribution of land and the agricultural dependence of the most of the 
population, the elites who owned land had complete control over the livelihoods of 
everyone else. 
 On the other end of the social spectrum were the indigenous Maya. In 1950, 53% 
of the population was indigenous. While that number declined over time to 43% in 1964, 
the distribution of the population favored indigenous power in rural Guatemala. The 
population was not distributed evenly, the Peten and Zacapa regions to the North East 
were very sparsely populated, the indigenous population was concentrated throughout 
the North Western highlands. The industrial and political center of the country was 
Guatemala City; which was the largest population center.9 While the indigenous 
population was in a majority for most of the nations history, it did not have the political 
                                                
7 "Guatemala’s Bourgeoisie," in Guatemala, ed. Susanne Jonas and David Tobis, 210-251 (North 
American Congress on Latin America, 1974).  
8  Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, "Guatemala Case Study," in Guerilla Warfare, 181-208 
(Wilmington, 1997).	  
9  Richard Adams, Cruxification by Power: essays on Guatemalan national social structure, 1944- 1966 
(Austin, 1970). 
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or economic power to make an impact on the national level.10 The stratification of 
Guatemalan society hurt the indigenous population most; they were excluded from 
society and had few possibilities for improvement. This stratification developed out of 
the exclusionary system employed by the Spanish, who had a complicated racial 
hierarchy, which influenced the creation of social classes. The social system, which 
developed in Guatemala, resulted in the indigenous populations isolation from 
Guatemalan society as a whole and their subservience to those with more land and 
political power. These divisions were made worse by some of the poorest economic and 
social conditions in the region.11 These social divisions carried over to the political 
spectrum dividing those who wanted to maintain the status quo of elite control and those 
who wanted to work toward reform and improve conditions for the masses. Guatemala 
was struggling to resolve these issues when the US destabilized the region through its 
intervention in 1954.  
*** 
 Following World War Two the tensions between the Soviet Union and the 
United States grew, creating a global standoff between these two superpowers. Europe 
was divided between east and west; the US in an attempt to stem Soviet expansion 
adopted the policy of containment. This military/ political strategy emphasized limiting 
the spread of communism to new countries in order to prevent a domino effect from 
                                                
10  Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala: a History of Race and Nation, describes the political power 
that indigenous elite were able to mobilize, but their impact was minimal by the 1960’s. 
11  United Nations, UNdata: a world of information, 2011, http://data.un.org/ (accessed May 16, 2011), the 
data only goes back to the 1950’s but illustrates Guatemala’s GDP growth % was consistently less then 
other Central American countries, and its infant mortality rate, a traditional marker of national poverty, 
was above the regional average.  
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occurring. Economic and military assistance was provided to Europe and Asia to ensure 
this goal. While this conflict originated in Europe and escalated due to disputes in Korea; 
by the 1950’s Latin America became involved. The fear of possible communist 
expansion into the western hemisphere motivated the US to help overthrow the president 
of Guatemala, Arevalo’s successor, Jacobo Arbenz.12   
 The 1954 coup was the major turning point in modern Guatemalan history, as 
such any story on modern Guatemala must start here. For the US, it was a moment when 
democracy triumphed over communism, a point where the CIA came in to their own as 
global players. However, the people of Guatemala experienced the aftermath of that 
event in quite a different way. The years following the removal of Jacobo Arbenz were 
violent and unstable, not just for a short period but for the next 40 years. The 
assassination of presidents and government officials became regular events along with 
frequent attempts to overthrow the government by revolutionary guerilla movements, 
which spread throughout the country. During this period of upheaval, the economy 
stagnated due to lackluster investment and disorganized planning. The centrality of the 
1954 coup to later events necessitates its place at the start of any story on modern 
Guatemala.13  
                                                
12 Two important works on the Cold War that provide complete overviews of the period are, Melvyn P. 
Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and The Cold War (New York, 
2007);  John Lewis Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997). 
13 Almost every analysis of the Guatemalan Civil War begins with a discussion of the 1954 coup or the 
Guatemalan Revolution. George Black, Milton Jamail, and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala 
(New York, 1984); ed. Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson and Nancy 
Peckenham, Guatemala in Rebellion: unfinished History (New York, 1983). The notable exception is Greg 
Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War, he does however cover the period 
in The Blood of Guatemala: a History of Race and Nation, which examines the culture and society of 
Guatemala from independence in the 19th century to the 1954 coup, that eventually leads to the Civil War.  
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The growing Central American economies that followed the end of the Second 
World War gave rise to modernizing political movements all across the region. In 
Guatemala, this period was referred to as “The Guatemalan Revolution” or “The Ten 
Years of Spring.” From 1944 to 1954 Guatemala maintained a democratically elected 
government, which was a monumental achievement for a nation historically run by 
autocratic caudillos. This government attempted to address many of the long-standing 
social, political, and economic problems which plagued the nation, and in doing so 
challenged the established social order and political structure.14 
In May and June of 1944, a military uprising with the assistance of students and 
urban workers successfully deposed dictator Jorge Ubico and instituted a government 
headed by a three-man junta. Juan Arevalo was then elected president in 1945. He began 
the process of reforming Guatemala by attempting to modernize the economy through 
increasing industrialization and land reform. According to historian Piero Gleijeses 75% 
of the labor-force was involved in agriculture at the time of the “revolution.” Arevalo 
attempted to reform rural education, and improve labor codes. However, these actions 
were met with particular resistance from Guatemalan conservative elites, and from US 
business interests that felt his actions threatened their investments. The opposition 
caused by these two forces severely limited the success of Arevalo’s reform attempts.15   
                                                
14  George Black, Milton Jamail, and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, P. 12. 
15  Richard Adams, Crucifixion by Power: essays on Guatemalan national social structure, 1944- 1966, 
details the social and political developments that occur during the “Guatemalan spring”, pointing out the 
weakness of Guatemalan society and how its attempts at reform actually progressed. This anthropological 
analysis illustrates how the reforms of the “revolutionary” period were effective to a degree but this 
process reinforced the polarization of Guatemalan society. 
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 The events surrounding the death of Major Francisco Arana illustrate the 
problem of social division that Guatemala’s conservatives posed. Major Arana was a key 
figure in the overthrow of Ubico and held the senior position within the subsequent 
junta. However, his ambition combined with growing pressure from the conservative 
elites against the new government gave him an opportunity to try and gain power. He 
became involved in organizing and threatening a rightist coup attempt, the conclusion of 
which was a controversial shootout between him and allies of Jacobo Arbenz which 
resulted in Arana’s death. Even during the height of the Guatemalan democratic 
movement, the factions within the military were pushing back against the liberal 
reformers, and trying to remove them from power. 16 
 In 1950, Jacobo Arbenz was elected president of Guatemala, and accelerated the 
reform movement started by his predecessor, exacerbating the tensions between Left and 
Right. According to Gleijeses, Arbenz was guilty of three key mistakes; he supported 
agrarian reform, had ties with the communist party, and did not respect the desires of US 
businesses. The US interpreted these factors to mean that Arbenz was a communist 
threat to US interests and the region. The result of this was that the CIA at the behest of 
President Eisenhower organized a military coup in Guatemala.17 
 In 1951, Arbenz legalized the communist party; this radical act polarized public 
opinion about him. Since the start of the Cold War, it had been standard procedure 
                                                
16 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 
(Princeton, New Jersey, 1991), P. 50-71. Gleijeses is now the standard text on the 1954 coup, having 
replaced other works like Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: the story of the American 
coup in Guatemala (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982) and  Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in 
Guatemala: the foreign policy of intervention (Austin, 1982). 
17 Ibid. P. 144. 
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throughout Latin America for nations supporting the US to outlaw the communist party. 
This curried favor with the US and increased the amount of control governments had on 
internal politics. The legalization of this political party set a very different precedent 
from that of other nations in the region. This departure from the norm along with 
Arbenz’s personal friendships with members of the PGT (Partido Guatemalteca del 
Trabajo, the Communist Party), which during the Arbenz’s administration was a 
relatively normal political party, damaged his image. Arbenz also employed members of 
the PGT in his staff and gave them positions in government. This increasing acceptance 
of Communism in his administration convinced the US that his presidency posed a threat 
to regional stability. 18 
 Agrarian reform was also a vital component of Arbenz’s platform; by addressing 
the longstanding problem of Guatemalan inequality he hoped to improve the lives of 
peasants who for the most part owned no land. Decree 900 was supposed to provide land 
to 100,000 impoverished peasants by dismantling some of the overly large farms which 
did not even use most of their land and dividing them up. The decree resulted in the 
expropriation of large amounts of unused United Fruit Company (UFCO) land. Despite 
complaints from US companies and conservatives within Guatemala, this moderately 
successful reform helped the economy and raised the standard of living for many people. 
This action strongly challenged the established order of Guatemalan society by giving 
the indigenous peasants hope and possibility for social improvement. While the reform 
was internally successful, the significant involvement of Communists in its 
                                                
18 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, P. 171-
207. 
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implementation and its effect on US business placed another wedge in the relationship 
between Arbenz and his conservative opposition as well as the US. 19  
 US business had long been a factor in Guatemalan history. The UFCO originated 
as a small US Banana import business, by the early 20th century it had grown into a 
diversified giant of Central American business. Due to the lack of infrastructure within 
Central American and Caribbean nations, the corporation had developed rail systems, 
ports, and telegraph lines to aid in the export of bananas, and purchased large tracts of 
land for crop production. The result of UFCO’s expansion was that it gained a powerful 
place in the economies and infrastructures of many Latin American nations, in particular 
Guatemala and Honduras. When the land reform began to threaten UFCO interests in 
Guatemala the company attempted to argue that their lands were targeted specifically. 
Despite the fact that the land reforms specifically focused on land that was not being 
used, the company was not pleased. The Guatemalan government was willing to pay the 
value of the land as was reported in their tax records, and since the UFCO had been 
consistently undervalued their land they were only offered three dollars per acre. This 
amount was significantly less than the seventy-five dollars an acre the company wanted, 
which further exacerbated the situation. Other companies like International Railways of 
Central America (a subsidiary of UFCO), and Electric Bond and Share, also claimed 
grievances over the new laws about wages and working conditions. This anger from US 
businesses was one of the key factors driving the US towards intervention.20 
                                                
19 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, P. 149-
170. 
20 George Black, Garrison Guatemala, P. 14-15; Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: 
the story of the American coup in Guatemala, P. 65-77. Paul Dosal, Doing Business with the Dictators: a 
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 The CIA operation code-named PBSUCCESS was the most important factor, 
which enabled the overthrow of the Arbenz government. A military unit in exile was 
organized and supplied by CIA handlers in Honduras and Nicaragua, and it was this unit 
in conjunction with sympathizers in the Guatemalan military that removed Arbenz from 
office. American planes with American pilots bombed Guatemala City during July of 
1954, also putting pressure on the Arbenz regime. President Eisenhower even publicly 
admitted that the US had been involved in the coup after his term in office was over.21 
This major Cold War victory was a component of Eisenhower trying to roll back the 
expansion of Communism. Without CIA assistance the coup would have been far more 
difficult and maybe impossible to achieve.22 However, it is impossible to say that US 
involvement was the only key determinant behind the coup, the military support against 
Arbenz was just as vital. This coup created the conditions in which the Guatemalan Civil 
War would take place.  
 Castillo Armas became the president of Guatemala through political deals 
following the coup. His term as president was marked by dependence on the US, a 
strong anti-communist program, and a weakening political system. Castillo Armas was a 
poor leader but he clearly saw his place as with the United States. A great deal of his 
administration focused on improving things that the US wanted fixed, namely putting an 
end to the communist threat and fixing the weak economic environment that hurt foreign 
                                                                                                                                           
political history of United Fruit in Guatemala, 1899-1944 (Wilmington, 1993), describes the development 
of the UFCO and its relationship with the infrastructure and politics of Guatemala, emphasizing how the 
company preferred to deal with dictators. 
21  Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956; the white house years (Garden City, 1963). 
22 Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala; rebels, death squads, and US power (San Francisco, 1991), 
P.30-34; Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, P. 99-117. 
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investment. “The keynote of our (US) policy toward Guatemala, therefore, is that the 
anti-communist victory of June 1954 must be preserved and consolidated and that we 
accept and work through the Castillo Armas government as the best present expression 
of Guatemalan desire for a free, genuinely anti-communist, democratic and progressive 
government.”23 Concerning those goals he was partially successful, he enacted strong 
anti-communist policies imprisoning thousands and approving illegal murders of many 
civilians; he also did improve conditions for big business by repealing most of the laws 
enacted by the previous regime. However in regards to improving government he failed; 
following his presidency, military rule would continue. He succeeded in accomplishing 
the most important goal of security from communism but the other goals of democracy 
and progressive government would remain unreached. Except for his administrations 
harsh repression of groups the US perceived as threats, the Castillo Armas presidency 
was a complete failure. The motivation behind his assassination remains unclear, but the 
numerous attempted military coups during his presidency illustrate the political divisions 
that his administration made worse and which would continued to cause future problems 
for Guatemala.24   
 Following the Guatemalan Coup the next major event in US-Latin American 
relations was the Cuban Revolution of 1959. The effect of this revolution on US-Latin 
American relations was critical. The success of the Cuban revolution suggested that 
containment had failed. Fidel Castro turned to communism as a model for 
                                                
23 NSA (National Security Archive) 00015, Operations Coordinating Board Plan for Guatemala, “Plan and 
Policy Regarding US Actions in Guatemala,” June/1/1955. 
24  Stephen M. Streeter, Managing Counter Revolution: the United States and Guatemala 1954-1961 
(Athens, 2000), P.33-58. 
 16 
socioeconomic transformation and the Soviet Union for support against the US. 
Moreover, the Cuban Government wanted to export revolution. The fear of Cuban 
communism was a powerful psychological factor for the US. Cuba had previously been 
strongly linked with the United States. The US fought the Spanish-American war 
ostensibly to help the Cuban people, and the economic/ social ties between these two 
nations were strong. This Affected US policy throughout the region and motivated broad 
US economic and military aid strategies throughout Latin America. The specter of Cuba 
prompted a renewed focus on the region by John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.25  
*** 
 The literature on the Alliance for Progress and the Presidents involved in its 
implementation deserves particular attention because of their impact on Guatemala 
during the 1960’s. The Alliance for Progress was an economic assistance program for 
Latin America, which was portrayed at time as being similar to the Marshall Plan in 
Europe. The goal of the Alliance for Progress was to improve economic and social 
conditions within a country, leading to a more stable government, which would make a 
communist takeover less likely. The literature on the Alliance focuses on two factors, the 
success or failure of the program and whether the Alliance ended with Kennedy or 
continued during the Johnson years. Almost as soon as the Alliance was implemented, it 
inspired criticism and discussion. Arthur M. Schlesinger, special assistant to president 
Kennedy was one of the first to claim that President Johnson killed the Alliance. Robert 
Kennedy JFK’s brother and Attorney General was also one of the early commentators 
                                                
25  Thomas Patterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution 
(Oxford, 1994); Louis Perez, Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy (Athens, 1990). 
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that blamed Johnson and in particular Thomas Mann, who Johnson appointed assistant 
secretary of state for Latin America and coordinator of the Alliance for Progress.26 The 
Alliance that Lost its Way by Jerome Levinson, who was an Alliance official during the 
Kennedy years, and Juan de Onis, a journalist, is a good example of a work that saw the 
Alliance as a positive attempt, but one that failed because of its overly ambitious goals, 
excessive bureaucracy, and frequent subordination to national security concerns. These 
early commentators were all part of the Kennedy administration and had personal 
involvement in the events they were commenting on.  
 The next group of authors who examined the alliance lacked this personal 
investment in the Alliance. Historians Stephen Rabe and Jeffery Taffet concur with their 
predecessors that the alliance was a failure, but think that it was due primarily to the 
ideological inconsistency of the US. The Alliance devolved from the idea of spreading 
progressive reform to a means of aiding political allies, thereby weakening its appeal 
throughout the region. Because of this disillusionment with the program, what was 
supposed to be an alliance between the US and Latin America became a US aid program 
with limited local input or investment. Rabe approaches the subject with a broad 
examination of the Alliance and its role throughout the region. Taffet provides a detailed 
assessment of the Alliance through several case studies and an exacting understanding of 
US policy and its players. Both these authors also expand their assessment of the 
Alliance to the Johnson years, although Taffet covers significantly more of the Johnson 
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years then Rabe. Johnson and Mann are presented as having changed the emphasis of the 
Alliance, with the Mann doctrine’s focus on political stability over social reform.27  
 Further complicating the assessment of Johnson and Kennedy’s involvement in 
the Alliance is the way their presidencies are portrayed. Kennedy has been the subject of 
numerous positive biographies28 and his success in foreign policy was exemplified by 
major events like the Cuban missile crisis. Johnson on the other hand, has been seen as a 
president with a domestic orientation. There have been numerous books emphasizing the 
tragedy of his administration and in particular his failures in regards to Vietnam.29 The 
positive perception of Kennedy and the negative perception of Johnson greatly affected 
how the Alliance has been perceived under their administrations. The image of Johnson 
is slightly more complicated, however. Randall B. Woods in LBJ: Architect of American 
Ambition explores Johnson’s liberal background, describing his desire for social reform 
as equal or greater than his predecessor. His assessment of the Vietnam War is also more 
positive, seeing it as a component of larger foreign policy concerns that were beyond 
Johnson’s control. In between the overly critical works and Woods’ more positive 
assessment, Robert Dallek’s Flawed Giant presents a more thorough account of 
Johnson’s policies. Dallek emphasizes foreign policy and points out many of Johnson’s 
flaws, in particular his poor response to criticisms of his Vietnam War policy, at the 
same time he also argues that there was continuity between the Kennedy and Johnson 
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administrations.30 The place of Johnson in history is not yet established. While reviled 
during his term in office, his impact is still being revised by scholars. As Joseph Tulchin 
points out it is tempting to explain changes in US foreign policy during the 1960’s as 
due to presidential personality and leadership. Yet both presidents illustrated a strong 
reaction to events in Latin America that was dictated more by larger Cold War concerns 
rather then any particular understanding of the region. Two examples he provides are 
Kennedy’s decisions at the Bay of Pigs, and Johnson with the Dominican Crisis. These 
larger concerns combined with a disillusionment with the Alliance dictated similar 
actions by both these presidents.31 This thesis will further develop the theme of 
continuity between the administrations, both were motivated by the same issues and took 
similar actions in Guatemala.  
*** 
 During the 1980’s at the height of the Guatemalan Civil War, the US public 
became aware of what was happening in Guatemala. Journalists began to report on the 
violence, and in turn, political scientists analyzed the events occurring there. The 
majority of the early literature on Guatemala can be put in one of these categories: 
journalism, political science, or anthropology. George Black, a journalist, was one of the 
first to provide a historical analysis of the Guatemalan Civil War. The process of 
establishing the events involved in the violence was his focus in Garrison Guatemala, 
which is no small task considering the difficulties of determining fact from rumor during 
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the extremely tumultuous 1980’s.32 Susanne Jonas a political scientist, continued the 
process of trying to establish what the important developments of the conflict were, and 
began analyzing the peace process which ended the conflict. More work has been written 
on the peace process than the war itself. Jonas continued to emphasize US involvement 
as a key factor in the process of the war.33 Both authors’ books provide good 
descriptions of the events happening in Guatemala yet they are still very much bound by 
the constraints of when they were written; the sources they rely on are primarily 
newspapers and political analyses. The Jonas book is more useful due to its longer 
timeframe and clearer prose. Both works provide examples of the same point in the 
development of the literature on Guatemala, each attempting to provide a basic 
understanding of events, and still heavily influenced by the leftist political sympathies of 
the time. Neither work examines the role the US played in Guatemala with any nuance, 
yet these authors captured the complexity of Guatemalan social division and placed the 
Guatemalans at the center of the story. These two works in particular illustrate a 
weakness in the literature that this paper will address; the events of the 1960’s are not 
differentiated from the Civil War as a whole. While it is convenient to examine the 
period from 1954 to 1996 as a continuous chain of events, this paper will illuminate the 
depth and complexity of the 1960’s, which differentiates it from the Civil War as a 
whole. While these are the first overall assessments of the Guatemalan Civil War, 
neither provides a historical analysis. They provide good information on what was 
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happening in Guatemala but do not link those events to the larger historical trends of that 
period.  
 Due to the lack of historical writing in the United States on the Guatemalan Civil 
War, Latin American scholars play an important role providing a great deal of 
background research. Unfortunately, in the case of the Guatemalan “Violencia,” the 
divisiveness of the subject matter makes a great deal of this material difficult for the 
scholar to use. There have been numerous personal accounts of the violence of the 
1980’s which are colored by the perspectives of the people who lived through those 
troubled times. The most famous personal account is that of Rigoberta Menchu,34 which 
was later found to be fabricated in part. While her cause of bringing public attention to 
the plight of the indigenous Guatemalan people was worthy, this example illustrates the 
lack of trust that can be placed in these types of accounts. There have also been quite a 
few accounts from Christian missionaries and guerillas.35 There are a few important 
analyses of the period in Spanish, like the truth commission report which examined the 
events of the Civil War in an attempt to bring into the open the horrors of the period. 
Violencia Institucional en Guatemala, 1960 a 1996: una reflexion cuantitiva,36 provides 
a statistical analysis of state violence during this period. But for the most part those 
works are the exception.   
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 So far, we have seen how little actual historical analysis has been done on the 
Guatemalan Civil War, yet there are two important books that have to be discussed. 
Stephen Streeter’s Managing the Counterrevolution is the first historical account to look 
beyond the 1954 coup and examine the roots of a counter-revolutionary ideology and 
program in the Castillo Armas and Ydigoras regimes. While this book does not directly 
look at the period of the Civil War, it does examine the development of the counter 
revolutionary tactics by the government and does so by examining archival material. 
While Stephen Streeter did not get access to archives in Guatemala, this work presents a 
fair and balanced analysis relying on historical material.37 It is also important because it 
lays the groundwork for this thesis by attempting to broaden the horizon of what is 
studied in Guatemalan history.  
 Greg Grandin is an author who looms large in the historiography of Guatemala; 
his first book The Blood of Guatemala brought to light the agency of the K’iche people 
in Guatemala during the first 200 years of Guatemalan history and their political cultural 
evolution. It also created a continuity of thought linking early Guatemalan social 
divisions to the political division of the 20th century. This work was the first in a two part 
series, the second being The Last Colonial Massacre, published in 2004, which picked 
up where the previous book left off and examined the violence and chaos of the Civil 
War period. Through these two works Grandin explained the foundation and structure of 
Guatemalan society, which resulted in genocide. The Last Colonial Massacre is the only 
historical assessment of the “Violencia,” and while it presents a generally balanced 
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assessment of the events, it maintains that the US played an inflammatory role in the 
Civil War during the 1960’s. While Grandin has done work at the National Archives and 
presidential libraries he primarily relied on archival material from Guatemala as well as 
personal interviews and the US side of the story is almost completely absent. There is 
also the problem of objectivity, Grandin was involved in the truth commission and had 
an established perspective. His presentation is generally sympathetic towards the rural 
majority and leftist Guatemalans leaving out those in power or in other areas of the 
country.38 While complete objectivity is of course impossible, his sympathy with the 
plight of Guatemala influenced the history as he portrays it.  
 The previous scholarship presents a great many assumptions about US 
involvement in Guatemala, namely that the US was a critical partner in developing a 
counter-insurgency program that led to genocide, and that US aid was an important 
factor in propping up military regimes. These works support those statements by 
mentioning US weapons sales and the training of Guatemalan military personnel at US 
bases in Panama and later in the continental US. However, none of the works previously 
mentioned actually examine in detail the US understanding of, or actions in Guatemala 
during the 1960’s. Therefore, the following chapters will attempt to provide a clearer 
understanding of what US personnel and government actually wanted to achieve and did, 
in fact, accomplish in Guatemala from 1961 to 1969.39   
*** 
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 Like Streeter this thesis relies heavily on US government documents published 
by the State Department, or available online, and the LBJ presidential library. By 
emphasizing Guatemalan internal political developments and structuring the paper 
around them, a more complete picture will emerge even as the thesis examines US 
foreign policy. Chapter II will examine the administration of presidents Miguel Ydigoras 
Fuentes and John F. Kennedy during the years 1961-1963. When the tensions with Cuba 
developed and a new organization was established, MR-13, the first of a number of 
significant guerilla movements in the 1960’s. Also examining US economic aid, to 
Guatemala during this period as well as the reasons for Ydigoras’ removal from office. 
These events lay the groundwork for the rest of the decade and the fractures in 
Guatemalan society that begin to develop before 1963 establish a downward trend. 
Chapter III will examine Enrique Peralta Azurdia’s military dictatorship from 1963 until 
the election of Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro in 1966. A comparison of Kennedy and 
Johnson’s policy during this period is of particular importance, as well as the major issue 
of Guatemalan political transition. US responses to events in Guatemala during this 
period illustrate the relatively limited engagement of the US in Guatemalan affairs. US 
perceptions of communist guerillas remained in the background even though a war was 
beginning to be fought. In 1966, the violence escalated and continued to do so until it 
was temporarily ended in 1968. This will be the focus of Chapter IV we will see how it 
affected US perspectives and actions. In particular, the Presidency of Mendez 
Montenegro established the precedent of state-sponsored terror, an issue that was almost 
completely ignored by the US at this time. During the 1960’s, Guatemala became a 
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country under siege from communist guerillas and its own government. While the 
United States did provide military and economic aid, they remained largely disengaged 
from the situation in Guatemala. After reading this thesis it should be apparent that the 
events occurring in 1960’s Guatemala and US involvement illuminate a more nuanced 
scenario, in which the key developments of this period occurred slowly over a ten-year 
period and that assumptions about foreign involvement are mostly false in what was 
primarily a conflict between Guatemalans. 
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CHAPTER II 
YDIGORAS FUENTES AND THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, 1960-1963: 
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE DECADE 
 
 In November 1960, while Senator John F. Kennedy was still on the presidential 
campaign trail he made a television appearance with Governor Luther Hodges of North 
Carolina the day before the election. During the question and answer session a man 
named Jack from Jacksonville, Florida asked, “what will you do about Castro?” 
Kennedy’s response to this question encapsulated the US perspective on Latin America 
during his administration. The Senator started by saying that something must be done 
about Castro and the danger from the close proximity of a communist nation that was 
intent on spreading its ideology, mentioning difficulties in Guatemala and Panama 
thought to be inspired by Castro’s influence with student and intellectual groups. After 
pointing out the inadequacy of current efforts to contain communism in the region, 
Kennedy elaborated on the economic weakness of the region and the importance of 
strengthening the region to resist communism. “So I would suggest that the United 
States try to develop again the spirit of the good neighbor policy of Franklin Roosevelt, 
that we regard this as the first line of defense, that we bring in students, that we 
broadcast in Spanish to Cuba and all of Latin America, that we tell our story, that we 
help them distribute their agricultural products and resources, and maintain their 
economy and provide a gradual increase in the standard of living for each person. This is 
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the key to Latin America.”40 The key for the Kennedy administration was this 
overarching desire to help increase the economic and social stability of the region. Yet, 
as the previously cited statement suggests, this was tempered by a conventional 
understanding of the situation, which was dominated by the threat of communism. In 
between the hopes for grand social planning and combating the fear of a communist 
insurgency, embassy officials and employees of various agencies in Latin America were 
stuck trying to fight for both these goals.  
*** 
 From 1958 to 1963 Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes was the president of Guatemala; he 
came to power through a series of political deals, which resulted in his appointment by 
the constituent assembly following the assassination of Castillo Armas and after the 
annulment of the original fraudulent election in which Castillo Armas’ party secured the 
election for its candidate. Ydigoras Fuentes’ successful bid for presidency was due in 
large part to split public opinion. The Guatemalan right wanted a stronger government, 
and the left held Castillo Armas and his party responsible for the coup against them in 
1954. Ydigoras Fuentes played off these two perspectives simultaneously presenting 
himself as both anti-communist and anti-American. While he had run for president 
against Arevalo in 1950 and lost, the 1958 election illuminated his sharp political 
acumen and ability to play both sides of the political spectrum. Ydigoras Fuentes’ anti-
Americanism in the early years of his presidency was not emotional but calculated. The 
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fact that his opponent Cruz Salazar was supported by the US in the election only served 
to strengthen his position. Disliking the disparity between the large amount of aid which 
his predecessor had received from 1954 to 1957 and the significantly smaller amounts 
his administration received, he consistently maneuvered for more US aid.41 Based upon 
Ydigoras Fuentes’ later attempts to manipulate public and international opinion it is 
reasonable to assume that his early anti-Americanism was only a ploy which helped him 
win political support.42  
 Guatemala after the Castillo Armas regime was united in its desire to not be 
controlled by a US puppet government. That a nation wanted to manage its own affairs 
without the interference of outside powers is understandable, yet as has been mentioned 
before, Guatemala has had precious few periods in its history when democracy and 
independence were a possibility. The election in 1958 was a moment when Guatemala 
could have returned to a democratic system. George Black claims that the military 
annulled the original election and the army high command imposed its own handpicked 
candidate, General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes.43 There is no evidence to support this from 
US documentation of the election; the election is instead described as situation in which 
a plurality could not be achieved, therefore, in the legislative assembly a political deal 
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was made, and Ydigoras assumed the presidency.44 The political division that made it 
impossible to declare a clear winner further illustrates the difficulty Guatemala had in 
establishing a legitimate working democracy. 
*** 
 Ydigoras’ American counterpart John F. Kennedy took office in January of 1961, 
however two events from 1960 have a profound impact on his administration’s influence 
in Guatemala. The training of forces for the Bay of Pigs Invasion in Guatemala, and the 
attempted Guatemalan military coup that resulted in the emergence of the guerilla group 
MR-13 were two such events. As has been stated previously, the issue of Cuba looms 
large, and was probably the most important feature of US-Latin American relations in 
the early 1960’s. A telegram from the embassy at Tegucigalpa, Honduras to the other 
Central American and Cuban embassies illustrates the tension throughout the region. 
Several Central American presidents attended a ball in the coastal town of Matias de 
Galvez in Guatemala, President Ydigoras Fuentes (Guatemala), and President Villeda 
Morales (Honduras) approached Ambassador Robert Newbeing and Ambassador John J. 
Muccio and informed them of their concern over US-Cuban relations. “Ydigoras 
expressed the view that the US should take forceful action now and even suggested that 
Guatemalan territory might be used for Castillo Armas type operation.” “Villeda 
suggested that possible Central American countries particularly Honduras, Guatemala 
and El Salvador might take some joint approach towards Castro with a view to softening 
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tensions.”45 While President Lemus Lopez of El Salvador did not want anything to do 
with these plans against Cuba, two Central American Presidents were thinking about 
Cuba and discussing it with US officials, and the fear of Cuban influence in the region 
only continued to grow. 
 The previous incident and the question Kennedy was asked while on the 
campaign trail mentioned at the beginning of this chapter illustrate how the issue of 
Cuba had begun to take on a mystique and power all its own. The loss of Cuba to 
communism had a particular power in the minds of Americans. For most of the 20th 
century the US had treated Cuba like a colony or protectorate. The images of American 
tourists at Cuban nightclubs and casinos had a strong place in the minds of the average 
American. When Cuba had a successful revolution based on an anti-American sentiment 
that transformed into support for communism, the traditional understanding of the 
Caribbean was shattered.46 US hegemony and power in its own backyard had seemed 
unchallenged after the defeat of Arbenz in 1954; until Cuba’s successful revolution in 
1959, communism had been a problem to deal with in far-off countries, like Greece, 
Germany, and Korea. After 1959 the US felt physically threatened by a communist 
country close to home; this shift in circumstances powerfully affected the American 
public and its leadership.47 
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 When discussing US-Cuban relations it is impossible to ignore the Bay of Pigs 
invasion. In 1961, a unit of anti-Castro Cuban exiles landed on the southwest coast of 
Cuba in order to begin a campaign against the Cuban government. The training of this 
group took place at Retalhuleu, Guatemala and at various locations in the US. This 
training was supported by Ydigoras Fuentes in the hope that it would improve his 
position with the US and give him a more favorable position when bargaining for aid or 
assistance. Despite significant training in Guatemala and the United States, the mission 
ended on the beach in complete failure. Cuban intelligence was warned of the invasion, 
partially because of the widespread knowledge within Guatemala that the training was 
occurring. After landing, the exile forces were trapped on the beach without air support, 
the ships carrying their supplies were destroyed by the Cuban air force, and their 
position came under fire quickly. 114 members of the invading force were killed and 
1189 were captured; the operation was a complete failure. This was one of the most 
embarrassing failures for the US during the Cold War. What the Bay of Pigs incident 
illuminates here is the potency of the US belief that it could effectively control the 
Caribbean and Latin America. The United States needed to focus on “the most 
dangerous area of the world.” The direct relationship of these events to Guatemala is that 
their training of these counter-revolutionaries further exacerbated Guatemala’s poor 
relationship with Cuba, and at the same time it motivated increased assistance to 
Guatemala from the US.48 
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 Ydigoras Fuentes by all accounts was a shrewd politician. Seizing on US 
tensions with Cuba, he began to make numerous and strident statements about the 
growing influence of Cuba and their efforts to train forces to overthrow the Guatemalan 
Government. In 1958 the US had made plans to sell surplus B-26’s to Guatemala but 
held off because of a desire to limit arms shipments to the Caribbean and not escalate 
tensions. However, when it became clear that Ydigoras was willing to purchase aircraft 
elsewhere, it was decided to sell Guatemala 8 planes.49 In May 1959, he claimed that a 
Cuban invasion fleet was approaching Guatemala, and on December 5, 1959 the 
Guatemalan representative to the OAS accused Cuba of supporting subversive 
movements in Guatemala. Both these accusations served the internal political purposes 
of Ydigoras Fuentes. The first allowed him to purchase a frigate for the navy without 
congressional approval and the second bolstered his political position with the anti-
communist Guatemalan Right. While the US knew that he was crying wolf, these actions 
still heightened tension between Cuba and Guatemala. Ydigora’s use of Cold War 
rhetoric allowed him to continually claim the political and moral high ground. He still 
held onto this ideology even after his removal from office. These tensions caused by 
Ydigoras Fuentes illuminate the problems between Guatemala and Cuba. The US was 
aware that Cuba posed no immediate threat to Guatemala, a nation that faced far greater 
internal issues, yet this difficult relationship between these two powers still created 
problems. 
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 The perception of Ydigoras’ government as a corrupt tool of US imperialism had 
a strong place in the mindset of Castro and his advisors. One of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s 
formative experiences was in Guatemala when Arbenz was overthrown. This event was 
seen as the height of US imperialism in Latin America, and Guatemala’s continuing 
association with the US further worked against any positive relationship with Cuba. 
Ydigoras’ use of Cold War rhetoric to justify his actions and policies did not just affect 
the internal situation in Guatemala but it severely affected Cuban-Guatemalan relations 
during the 1960’s. The Cuban response to Guatemalan rhetoric was loud and angry; the 
Cuban Foreign Minister stated on April 23 “in these very moments, with the complicity 
of President Ydigoras and the United Fruit Company,” Guatemala was being used to 
invade Cuba. On April 25th, a Cuban radio station stated that Ydigoras’s support of US 
actions against Cuba was to repay the aid they gave him in his rise to power. On April 
30th in what was described by the Department of State as “a document unique among its 
kind,” Cuba made several statements about their break in relations with Guatemala. 
Some of the more interesting statements from this document were made about Ydigoras, 
and “his lunatic harangue.” “His senile nervousness before internal difficulties,” the 
statement continued, “has carried him to a delirious state.” He was also called a “flabby, 
demented chief of state,” and the “Syngman Rhee of Central America.”50 From these 
statements, it is clear that Cuban-Guatemalan relations were not good; this tension would 
persist and lead to future clashes between these two nations. The tension between these 
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two nations never did develop into open conflict, but, in many ways, mirrored the Cold 
War that their more powerful allies the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged 
in. When violence did heat up in Guatemala, it was not due primarily to international 
tensions, but instead internal problems.  
*** 
On November 13th 1960, dissident elements of the Guatemalan military 
attempted to revolt against the Ydigoras government. This included attacks on a garrison 
in Guatemala City, and military bases in the cities of Puerto Barrios, Zacapa in eastern 
Guatemala. Between 51 and 60 officers of the Guatemalan military were involved in this 
revolt. While not very successful in Guatemala City itself, the rebels were able to take 
control of the important rail hub at Zacapa and the port city of Barrios. It took four days 
for government forces to dislodge the rebels; only after a lengthy aerial bombardment 
followed by a ground assault were those cities retaken. By the 17th government forces 
once again controlled these cities; however, rebel forces were still at large in the 
surrounding countryside. 51  
This rebellion consisted of young disaffected army officers. Due to the Cold War 
atmosphere there was a great deal of discussion about this rebellion being communist-
inspired. Immediately after the attempted rebellion, the Foreign Minister of Guatemala 
informed the embassy about a Castro-inspired rebellion they had been warning the US 
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about.52 Despite the reiteration of this line about a communist attack against Guatemala, 
it was quickly apparent that the rebellion was not organized by Cuba because there had 
been no assistance from them. It was also concluded that it could not have been a 
communist-inspired rebellion because the PGT was not involved; nor was there any 
student or worker action within the capital or other cities.53 The actual motivation behind 
the November 13th revolt was a younger corps of officers’ dissatisfaction with military 
finances and organization. Due to nepotism by the Defense Minister, a circle of high-
ranking officers maintained positions of privilege and influence. In addition to issues of 
favoritism, the military budget had been consistently decreasing. The budgets of younger 
officers were most affected. The nepotism and financial situation was blamed on the 
Minister of Defense Ruben Gonzales Sigui; there was even a point where a rebel faction 
in Zacapa offered to surrender if he stepped down.54 It is clear that the rebels were not 
inspired by either communism or Cuba. The use of Guatemala as a training base for the 
Bay of Pigs invasion is often described as one of the key motivators for the MR-13 
rebellion.55 However, while this could have been a factor in the rebellion, it certainly 
was not the most important. No one on November 13 was calling for US training units to 
leave or making any negative statements about the US in general. Instead, the forces in 
rebellion were making issues of government corruption and the removal of high-ranking 
military officers. The younger military officers who led the rebellion were not happy 
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about the way the older officers were running things and the training of Cubans was just 
another issue which they did not like. The November 13th rebellion was the birth of the 
MR-13 guerilla movement in name only. After the attempted rebellion, the individuals 
involved dispersed, hiding in the countryside or going into exile until some of them 
united with other dissidents and formed a guerilla front. The idea of seeking military 
reform would gradually fade from the movement as it became aligned with the PGT and 
accepted Cuban assistance. The MR-13 movement became more concerned with fighting 
the established order, and with the alliance with communists came an adoption of 
communism as an ideology. This rebellion marks the beginning of what has been called 
‘la violencia’ in Guatemala.56 
It must be noted that while the Guerilla insurgency is a major component in the story of 
Guatemala during the 1960’s, these groups will not be the focus of this thesis. While 
significant work deserves to be done on these groups and their evolution during this 
period, the constraints of time and the difficulty of obtaining information on these 
necessarily secretive organizations limits their role in the following pages. There has 
also been no definitive work done on these organizations. They are discussed in the 
works by journalists on the Guatemalan Civil War, but there is no strong consensus 
about the details of their development and actions.57 The composition and motivation of 
MR-13 as well as that of the Fuerzas Armadas en Rebelde (FAR, the radical military 
arm of the PGT) were constantly shifting and evolving during this period. While MR-13 
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originated as part an attempted military coup, it would later be involved with other anti-
government forces with stronger communist ties. These two groups along with others 
would form alliances and break out on their own, with little consistency or cooperation. 
If their role in the following pages is understated, this reflects the American view of 
these events.  
*** 
The immediate US response to the events of November 13th was not as strong as 
one might have expected. Prior to the rebellion, the need for more funds to go to 
Guatemala was already being discussed.58 The establishment of an information and 
intelligence bureau to train Guatemalans and create a reliable information network had 
also been recommended five months before the outbreak of fighting.59 When the 
Ydigoras administration came under attack a few months later, the only response from 
the US was to reaffirm their support of Ydigoras, to rush grant aid and deploy American 
forces in the region for intelligence gathering purposes. The notes from a National 
Security Council briefing illustrate that despite the fear of Cuban insurgency, no 
intelligence from Guatemala supported the theory that Cuba was involved in the 
rebellion, and Ydigoras seemed to have the situation under control.60 Almost every other 
intelligence assessment continued to state that the guerilla forces that developed from the 
November rebellion did not pose a threat to the Guatemalan Government and US aid 
mirrored this belief in the government’s stability.  
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The US assessment of the Guatemalan situation following the November 
rebellion was of particular importance. Guatemala after 1954 was supposed to be the 
model of success for Central American nations. Before Castro took power, Guatemala 
provided an example of the defeat of communism in the western hemisphere, yet after 
1960 the façade began to crack. Despite the awareness that the MR-13 rebellion was not 
inspired by communism US officials continued to initially look at Cuba as the cause of 
problems in Guatemala, only acknowledging internal factors slowly. Organizations like 
the USIS (United States Information Service), whose stated primary objectives were “to 
expose the international Soviet communist conspiracy,” “to expand Guatemalan support 
of the US,” and “to develop understanding and confidence in social, economic, and 
political institutions of a free society,” operated only within a Cold War mindset, and 
never adjusted to the need for new goals or understanding in the region. 61  
The USIS represented one extreme of the spectrum of US understanding of 
Guatemala; on the other side, most diplomatic communications from Washington 
represent a more dispassionate approach. The tone is neutral and analytical. In response 
to urgent requests from the embassy in Guatemala and the Government of Guatemala for 
aid, Washington replied. “We recognize possible value of timely assurance to Ydigoras 
of US support against external aggression. However we also recognize Castro regime 
indications its intention avoid action that could be labeled aggression, and that much of 
Ydigoras opposition is non-communist. Under these conditions our objective is to 
encourage Ydigoras in his difficult situation while limiting any adverse publicity 
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resulting from such action.”62 That Washington understood the opposition against 
Ydigoras was non-communist shows their more critical perspective, and ability to 
sometimes look beyond a myopic Cold War perspective. This was a typical response 
from Washington; it attempted to maintain a good relationship with the Guatemalan 
Government, while at the same time maintaining their distance and not becoming too 
involved in the internal problems of a foreign government. 
In the middle of these two extremes, the US embassy and its officials represented 
an important middle ground. The embassy did not have the vested interest in presenting 
the problems in Guatemala as primarily communist-inspired like the USIS or in 
distancing themselves from those problems like other arms of the foreign policy 
apparatus. Instead, communications from the ambassador to Washington DC presented 
well-rounded assessments of the situation in country, mentioning both key issues, the 
communist threat and internal political problems. While a more complete assessment of 
the situation was generally provided by the embassy, it consistently sided with the 
Guatemalan Government’s goals and objectives in recommending US action and aid. In 
this particular case the embassy concluded that “it is very much in the security and 
foreign policy interests of the United States for the present Guatemalan Government to 
complete its term and keep the country on the road of democracy.”63 While there was no 
serious trend towards democracy in Guatemala, the government under Ydigoras Fuentes 
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was anti-communist and willing to work with the US, so it was portrayed in a positive 
light.  
*** 
In addition to the US and Guatemalan response to the MR-13 rebellion and their 
continuing efforts to destabilize the government, two other events of particular 
importance happened during 1961. A new ambassador was appointed to the Guatemalan 
post, and Belize became an international issue. The appointment of John O. Bell was 
important, as he held the position of ambassador to Guatemala throughout the remainder 
of the Kennedy administration and some of the Johnson administration; ambassador 
John J. Muccio was replaced on November 15, 1961 and Bell was replaced by John 
Gordon Mein on September 3, 1965. Bell was a career foreign service officer with 
significant experience managing various US aid programs, his previous position being 
regional director of ICA (International Cooperation Administration) operations in the 
Near East and South Asia. By installing John Bell, a man with considerable experience 
in managing foreign assistance, Kennedys’ commitment to the Alliance for Progress was 
apparent. A point of particular interest was that Ambassador Bell traveled to his post by 
car along the Inter-American highway in order to further publicize US funding of that 
project.64  
 The issue of Belize from a US perspective, while less important than economic 
or military aid, helps illuminate the limits of the not so special relationship between 
Guatemala and the US. Guatemala had a long-standing border dispute with Britain and 
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its territory British Honduras. In 1961 president Ydigoras claimed that a deal was struck 
with the US whereby in return for helping stage the Bay of Pigs invasion the US would 
intercede in the dispute on behalf of Guatemala.65 While the US firmly denied any such 
deal and no record exists of it, the issue did not go away. The directions from Dean 
Rusk, the Secretary of State, in response to this claim, was to be polite and friendly but 
non-committal about the issue of Belize and point out the lack of a record of any such 
agreement.66 This strategy was fairly representative of US-Guatemalan relations. When 
asked for money, materials, or direct aid the US was most likely to reassure Guatemala 
of their continued support but not take any significant action. Only if there were 
extenuating circumstances like the immediate threat of a Communist takeover or the 
possibility of a government collapsing did the US get involved. While Belize continued 
to be an issue for the Johnson administration, it, like Guatemala’s internal divisions, 
would remain largely ignored by US policy makers.67  
*** 
 After the initial November 13th revolt, there were no major disturbances of the 
peace for some time. Guatemalan police continued searching for those involved or 
linked to the revolt. However the police force was largely unsuccessful. This was mainly 
due to the wild and mountainous terrain in northeastern Guatemala where most of the 
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participants of the rebellion went into hiding, as well as the general incompetence of the 
Guatemalan police force.68 Several reports from the US embassy mention police 
attempts to capture individuals involved in the revolt, in particular Cesar Augusto Sosa, 
half-brother to Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, the leader of the MR-13 front at that time. 
However, these attempts were unsuccessful and drove many of those involved in the 
MR-13 rebellion to seek refuge in Mexican and Venezuelan embassies, from which they 
fled the country.69 More successful than any attempts to quell the revolt and punish those 
involved was the political repression that immediately followed. The November revolt 
was used to justify imprisoning political opponents, particularly those who had run 
against Ydigoras in the previous presidential election. Mario Mendez Montenegro, head 
of the Partido Revolucionario (Revolutionary Party, PR) , was arrested under suspicion 
of being involved in the revolt despite any evidence to support that claim; he would 
eventually be released and exiled. Mario Sandoval Alarcon, leader of the MLN party, 
and five others were also exiled to El Salvador.70 Despite a minor shootout between 
police and a few individuals attempting to escape arrest, there were no serious violent 
incidents in Guatemala in 1961. However this tranquility would not last, as violence and 
political movements began again in early 1962.  
 The year did not start out well for the Guatemalan government. In January there 
were scattered bombings in Guatemala City. While there were no significant casualties 
from these attacks, they illustrate how government pressure against those involved in the 
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November 13th coup and opposition parties had radicalized segments of the population. 
MR-13 also began to try to strengthen its position by seeking out alliance with other 
political parties. This would lead to a consolidation with radical members of the PGT 
and other dissatisfied elements of Guatemalan society. On February 7, 1962 50 men led 
by Yon Sosa attacked the Bananera military detachment north of Zacapa and south of 
Puerto Barrios. They forced a UFCO employee Robert Richards to open the safe and 
absconded with 18,000 Quetzals.71 While there was no serious damage done, some 
prisoners were taken. The government of Guatemala remained worried about possible 
ties with Cuba as well as the likelihood that the guerillas would use the money to buy 
more weapons and supplies.72 It would be easy to think that MR-13 would continue to 
expand its operations and remain the biggest challenge to the government; however the 
general public also began to mobilize against the Ydigoras administration.73  
 In March following the opening of a new session of Congress, students began to 
protest the clearly fraudulent appointment of congressional positions to members of 
parties that were disliked by the majority of the population. 27 of 33 seats went to the 
pro-government coalition of Redencion, MND (National Democratic Movement), and 
PUD (Democratic Unity Party); particularly fraudulent was the attempt to award 2 of 4 
seats representing Guatemala City to pro-government individuals despite the fact that, 
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according to an ARA (American Relief Administration/ Bureau of Inter-American 
Affairs) report, those parties received less than 20% of the vote. The student protests 
were mostly peaceful until the 13th, when judicial police began using force to try to 
control the crowds. They opened fire on crowds and used extreme force in attempts to 
disperse demonstrators. The protests spread and rioting broke out. The government 
violence further motivated the population, spurring support from rail workers as well as 
a sympathetic general public. The functioning of trains and industry became very 
difficult as these protests expanded into riots. The riots were not stopped until the 17th 
when the military took control of the city and reduced the riots to occasional outbursts. 
The US assessment of the situation estimated at least 22 deaths, over 500 wounded and 
1000 arrests.74 This event marked the first public protests with a mass appeal to take 
place in Guatemala since the 1954 coup. Until judicial police violence turned them into 
riots, these had been peaceful if illegal protests. This is important because it marks one 
of the few occasions during the Ydigoras administration when large portions of the 
population mobilized to express a political opinion.  
*** 
 The burgeoning violent activities of MR-13 and more importantly the public 
protests and riots forced the US to re-evaluate the Guatemalan situation. Prior to the 
March protests, there was no significant action taken by the US in response to 
Guatemalan events. Unlike the lack of response provided after the November revolt, the 
March riots motivated a serious response. The US commander and chief of the 
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Caribbean forces was reinforced with 6 C-130’s on March 16th, one battle group of 1400 
men was put on alert, and naval forces were moved near the region.75 The fear of the 
possible collapse of the Guatemalan government motivated these military actions. These 
actions did not actually result in direct US involvement but still suggest the United 
States’ very serious concerns.  
 US policy toward and perspective on Guatemala was dominated by two factors, 
internal security and stability. Consistently US communications emphasized these two 
issues and focused on assessing whether the Guatemalan Government was able to 
maintain stability and security. Internal security is best defined as the means with which 
the government controls its population. Stability refers to whether the government was 
maintaining peace, avoiding communist interference, and continuing to hold onto 
political power. Another factor that may play a role in stability is democracy. While the 
US commitment to that ideal is frequently overstated, it generally was seen as an 
important part of creating stable countries. Yet it must be noted that as far as the US 
foreign policy was concerned, the appearance, not the reality, of democracy was most 
important. As can be seen through the example of Guatemala and in other Latin 
American countries during this period, US policy wanted to build democracies but not at 
the expense of creating stabile non-communist countries. The following quote from 
Ambassador Bell points out Washington’s emphasis on internal security, at the same 
time illustrating the disconnect between policy and follow through. “I have become 
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deeply concerned by comparing, on one hand, number of messages from Washington 
concerning the importance of assisting this government to maintain tolerable internal 
security posture and the embassy’s corresponding responses and recommendations to 
Washington and, on the other hand, the record of difficulty in securing action with 
respect to Guatemala on the Washington end.”76 In short, despite Washington claiming 
that internal security was important, Ambassador Bell thought more needed to be done. 
The internal security issue was so central to US goals in Guatemala that one of the few 
direct memorandums to the president on the subject of Guatemala was about providing 
equipment for internal defense.77 The March demonstrations and riots illuminated the 
weakness of the Guatemalan state and the lack of skill in responding to this challenge. 
This exposure of Guatemala’s inability to successfully maintain internal security greatly 
worried the US, which had been investing in Guatemala’s ability to manage this issue 
since 1954.78  
 Improving stability was a more difficult concept to define but still was the end 
goal of US policy. Throughout US State Department records discussing assistance to 
Guatemala the theme of stability is repeated. Not democracy or rule of law, the term 
stability was aimed more at the idea of whether the national government was in control 
and at the same time preventing communist influence. The fear of communism was 
incorporated into this idea about stability, especially during the Kennedy administration 
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whose perspective was heavily influenced by fears of Cuban communist expansion. 
Consistently near the end of reports or assessments of the Guatemalan situation, there 
were one or two points mentioning the possibility of communist takeover or action. It is 
important to note that while communism was consistently a feature in US reports, it was 
understood by the majority of US officials in Guatemala that the biggest problem facing 
the stability of the Guatemalan government was the political divisions on the right and in 
the military.79 The military leadership and the conservative right who were powerful 
factors in Guatemala were not satisfied with how Ydigoras was running the country. 
This, combined with leftist pressure against his government, posed a serious problem for 
his administration that would continue to worsen.  
 In discussing US actions in Guatemala, the specific actions of President Kennedy 
that affected Guatemala must be examined. The development of a counter-insurgency 
special group had a direct impact on Guatemala. The second presidential directive also 
known as National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) #2 laid out JFK’s desire to 
develop counter-guerilla forces, a previously weak facet of US military strategy. This 
represented a radical departure from previous military theories, which placed no 
importance on unconventional warfare.80 Kennedy’s desire to develop this type of 
warfare capability created a situation in which the Guatemalan armed forces could profit 
from this new US strategy. “I would appreciate hearing what steps we are taking to train 
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the armed forces of Latin America in controlling mobs, Guerrillas, etc.”81 The CI 
(counter-insurgency) group was created following this presidential directive #88 to 
address these issues and played an important role determining what sort of resources and 
training would best help nations like Guatemala build and maintain a strong counter-
insurgency capability. The US support and training of Central American CI forces is one 
of the major reasons that many commentators have laid blame for the Guatemalan 
repressive counter-terror tactics on the US. It is true that the US was involved in helping 
Guatemala’s military establishment, but this was a secondary emphasis. While the role 
of the US in training the Guatemalan military will be discussed at length later, however 
it must be noted that this counter-insurgency approach originated with President 
Kennedy.  
 This directive (NSAM #88) also emphasized building strong capable police 
forces in Latin America, police forces capable of maintaining control of the rural 
countryside and order in the cities. This statement by President Kennedy continued the 
trend of the US emphasizing police capabilities. Even though it was ostensibly 
addressing the military, the majority of the memorandum talked about having the FBI 
help train foreign police forces. While there was training of military personnel, the 
emphasis continued to be on professionalizing the police, a process that had begun after 
the overthrow of Arbenz.82 The concept of internal defense necessitated that the US 
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focused on building police forces, not military forces. Building a strong military in 
Guatemala would not have helped maintain order since the US believed that a stronger 
military would have motivated public opinion against the administration and caused 
more internal division. However, a strong and professional police force could maintain 
stability and control riots as well as not arouse the anger or resentment of the population 
and aid in the process of building a better nation.83 This, however, was not how things 
turned out. Instead, the fractured nature of the Guatemalan police forces and influence of 
political pressure on the police resulted in violent repression. This quote describes the 
US assessment of the Guatemalan action during the March riots, “In all events the action 
of the government of Guatemala in handling the riots was directly contrary to the advice 
and teaching which the police had received through the AID public safety program.”84 
Despite the continued poor performance of police forces in that crisis, training continued 
and by the late 1960’s the police became more professional and efficient, while other 
organizations took on the role of repression.  
 The Alliance for Progress was Kennedy’s most well-known contribution to Latin 
America. The most complicated aspect of US relations with Latin America was this 
broadly focused economic aid plan for the entire region. The goal of the Alliance was to 
improve economic and social conditions within a country, thereby leading to a more 
stable government, which would make a communist takeover less likely. In his inaugural 
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address, Kennedy introduced this program. “To our sister republics south of our border, 
we offer a special pledge--to convert our good words into good deeds in a new alliance 
for progress to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. 
But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all 
our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion 
anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends 
to remain the master of its own house.”85 The desire to improve the lives of Latin 
Americans was clear, while at the same time we are reminded of the primacy of the 
Communist threat in the minds of US planners. This however is the simplified 
explanation of the US strategy toward Latin America. These were the primary goals of 
US policy, increasing democracy, social justice and welfare, as well as reducing the 
threat of communism; but which of those goals were the most important, and how they 
were achieved differed from country to country radically.86 
The Alliance’s complexity and variety of different goals led to it being executed 
in many diverse ways, unique to each of the nations that compose Latin America. A 
clear example of this is that before the Punta del Este conference in Montevideo, 
Uruguay August 1961, the president’s task force on Latin America report emphasized 
the importance of financial assistance to Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia. These nations 
were emphasized because of their large debts and the financial crises that they were 
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experiencing, $559 million dollars of Brazilian debt was rescheduled and $338 million 
dollars of new financing was provided, with similar situations taking place in 
Colombia.87 Each nation’s economic situation and their vulnerability to communism 
played a role in how important they were, and how much aid they should get from the 
Alliance. In 1961, Chile received $135.6 million dollars of economic assistance; 
Guatemala received $31.8 million dollars.88 It is one thing for a nation like Brazil whose 
population far exceeds that of Guatemala’s to receive significantly more assistance yet 
Chile’s population was only slightly larger than Guatemala’s. But there was a marked 
difference in the amount of aid given to these two countries.89 Both Guatemala and Chile 
were having problems with communists. The near election of Salvador Allende in 1958 
and possibility of his election in 1964 was a problem. Allende had ties to communists 
and a socialist agenda, created a significant amount of fear from the US and resulted in 
assistance being funneled to his opponent Eduardo Frei. The important thing to note is 
that the Alliance was not uniform. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Panama received the 
most assistance out of the seven Central American republics during the Kennedy 
administration. Each received around $50 million each during his administration. That 
was relatively little when compared to the South American nations who received far 
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more assistance. This should make it clear that Central America was not the focus of US 
attention. 
Most scholars have avoided discussing the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala in 
favor of the Military Assistance Program (MAP).90 However, the Alliance for Progress 
should be examined to a greater extent in this situation. The overemphasis on MAP is 
due primarily to the development of Guatemala into a militarized society; historians and 
political analysts have emphasized military development over economics because of 
those factors’ potent place in Guatemala’s recent history. The 1960’s as a period when 
there was a greater emphasis in US policy on economic aid are also brushed over quickly 
by these authors, rushing to get to the heart of the conflict in the 1980’s. 
Yet the economic stability of Guatemala was regularly the focus in State 
Department communications.91 There was significantly more economic aid going to 
Guatemala then military aid. In 1961 $400,000 dollars of MAP assistance was provided 
relative to the $31.8 million dollars of economic aid that went to Guatemala, 
significantly more. Even at MAP’s highest level in 1963 with $2.6 million dollars it was 
surpassed by the $9.3 million dollars in AID for 1962, the low point for the Kennedy 
administration.92 Guatemala is a small country and a little bit of funding should have 
been able to go a long way, yet the country continued to struggle economically. 
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Authors like Stephen Rabe and Jeffery Taffet have explored in detail how and 
why the Alliance failed. They point out that economic aid cannot be successful at 
effecting long term social change when it is targeted at short-term issues; such as 
elections, and political control. The Alliance also failed to understand each country’s 
individual situation.93 The Alliance for Progress under the Kennedy administration in 
Guatemala focused on several programs but in general provided large loans to the 
government. US aid provided $2.2 million in food aid grants. The Peace Corps was 
founded and did receive $1.2 million for Guatemala in 1963. The inter-American 
highway project also received $800,000 dollars and was the subject of publicity thanks 
to Ambassador Bell. But as mentioned above the vast majority of assistance went to 
USAID grants or loans and not any particular project directed at an issue in need of 
improvement. Over Kennedy’s years in office $11.5 million was provided for social 
progress trust fund loans, these were the only loans directed at a particular issue, and its 
was only a third of the total $28.9 million in total economic aid from 1961-1963.94  
While there are clear records of how much money the US was giving to 
Guatemala, there is very little evidence of what happened to the money in Guatemala. 
There are occasional references in US diplomatic communications about the success of 
various programs but no details about how the majority of the money was used. This is 
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an area where further research needs to be done. It is possible that through an 
examination of Guatemalan archives or corporate records of US and Guatemalan 
businesses that a more specific accounting of US aid could be achieved. According to 
David Tobis, these corporations were receiving funds.95 Despite this weakness, the 
amount of aid and what the US intended it to be used for can be seen from the data 
provided here. This problem of understanding what happened to US aid in Guatemala 
does not hinder understanding what US policy towards Guatemala was. 
The alliance did attempt to stabilize and build the Guatemalan economy as it did 
in many other nations, but the failure to take into account the foreign business structure 
and deep social divisions in Guatemalan society completely nullified any attempts at 
reform. The UFCO, IRCA (International Railroad of Central America), and Empresa 
Electric were three US corporations that all but dominated the Guatemalan economy for 
decades. During Kennedy’s presidency, they made up 43% of foreign investment in 
Guatemala. The overwhelming presence of US corporations in Guatemala’s weak 
economy retarded any progress towards economic independence and growth.96 It may be 
that the aid went directly into the hands of a strong oligarchy, which controlled much of 
Guatemala’s economic capacity. Around 165 or so families traditionally held a 
significant percentage of the country’s wealth and power; these individuals represented 
the powerful conservative elites that supported the military and wanted to limit reform to 
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maintain their economic dominance.97 The funds from the Alliance were going directly 
to a government and the conservative elite that wanted to limit reform, so the goal of 
improving social conditions was unlikely to ever be accomplished. While the economic 
aspect of the Alliance was failing, the country did not fall to Communism. Guatemalans 
were focused on Cold War divisions and the aid received, while successful in 
temporarily bolstering a failing economy, had no powerful social impact. 
*** 
 By 1963 the situation in Guatemala had become more politically charged, 
following the March protests against the government, Ydigoras’ weakness was apparent 
to most observers, and pressure was being placed on his administration from the left and 
right sides of the political spectrum. The US also began to better understand that some of 
the problems in Guatemala were directly linked to Ydigoras’ policies. “He and his 
immediate entourage are thoroughly corrupt and becoming conspicuously so even for 
Latin America”98 This harsh assessment of the Guatemalan president illuminates the fact 
that when the US, which had been historically very forgiving of corrupt allies, started 
worrying about your ethics, problems were not very far away. In April following the 
March protests, US officials began to speculate about options for dealing with whoever 
succeeded Ydigoras. 
 Once again, the military was not pleased with Ydigoras; this time the air force in 
particular was upset. The Guatemalan financial weakness resulted in continued cuts and 
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lack of funding for the air force, creating a situation similar to the circumstances 
surrounding the November 13 rebellion. On December 25th 1962, several people were 
killed or injured and a great deal of property damage was done when this military faction 
attempted to seize power.99 It was a small group, however, and was quickly stopped. 
This incident like previous ones resulted in the imprisonment of political rivals 
unconnected to the attempted coup, as well as a request for the delivery of several jets 
from a previously approved aid program, to help placate the air force members calling 
for more funding and resources.100 While this was happening there were still leftist 
movements plotting action against the government. Enemies on both sides of the 
political spectrum surrounded the Ydigoras regime, and all it took was one poor decision 
to cause a successful coup. 
 1963 was an election year in Guatemala, whose presidents serve six-year terms. 
It looked as if the unexpected was going to happen, and President Ydigoras was going to 
serve a full term and be the second elected president in Guatemalan history to do so. 
Early on, the right’s biggest fear was the possible return of Juan Jose Arevalo to run for 
office again. He was still very popular with the left, and despite not having any ties to 
the PGT itself, not to mention the Guerilla movements, the fear was that he would return 
and be the “Trojan horse of communism.”101 In the minds of the Guatemalan right and 
military, the definition of a Communist might best be described as someone from a 
moderate or progressive political position, thus Arevalo, a leftist reformer, was seen as a 
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communist. This perception of Arevalo as the vanguard of communism inspired renewed 
plotting against the Ydigoras regime. As has been mentioned, Ydigoras was politically 
astute and he attempted to balance this precarious situation through several political 
maneuvers. Ydigoras at several points was close to allowing Arevalo to return to 
Guatemala but kept holding off, trying to play to the left’s growing protests and placate 
the right’s fear of a return to leftist rule. However, as the year continued, violence, 
bombings, student protests, and protests from the right continued to occur and 
destabilize the country.102 Ydigoras was able to maintain control of the country, stopping 
the rioting, and ending protests on both sides of the political spectrum. However that 
control would not last long. On March 27 Arevalo returned to Guatemala, and began to 
organize his political party. Three days later, the military acted to stop what they 
perceived as a communist threat to their country and a possible challenge to their power 
in the government.  
 On March 30, 1963 at midnight, three representatives of the Guatemalan army 
visited President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes at Casa Crema (the presidential palace) and 
informed him that the military had assumed control of the government. He was given the 
opportunity to take refuge in a foreign embassy but refused and was taken into custody. 
At 9:00 AM, a plane with him and his wife flew to Managua, Nicaragua.103 This was the 
story of Ydigoras Fuentes’ removal from office according to the US State Department.  
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In comparison the story as told by Ydigoras Fuentes in his memoirs, My War 
with Communism, is quite different. According to him, his own military betrayed him 
after being corrupted by Fidel Castro. In order to remove him from office they sent six 
tanks and 900 men to invade his home. Only after a tank broke down his door and six 
men with submachine guns threatened him was he taken into custody, all the while 
vowing to never surrender.104 While his story was clearly exaggerated, the State 
Department’s assessment of events is too bland, and Ydigoras’ verbose nature makes the 
last part about him swearing never to surrender very believable. A great deal of blame 
for the inconsistent stories of this event can be placed on the fact that Ydigoras Fuentes 
was writing a memoir glorifying his efforts to fight communism; certainly, the 
Guatemalan military had no ties to Castro. The day after Ydigoras was removed, 
Arevalo left for Mexico; for the next two years, the nation of Guatemala was controlled 
directly by the military and the Minister of Defense, Enrique Peralta Azurdia.  
 During the Presidencies of Ydigoras Fuentes and John F. Kennedy, challenges to 
Guatemalan stability emerged, and when the US took action it did so haphazardly. 
Ydigoras focused on external issues like Cuban communism, and territorial disputes 
with Belize. His policies resulted in further political division in Guatemala; the upheaval 
created by those divisions, combined with the decision to allow former president 
Arevalo to return to the country, resulted in his removal from office. Kennedy tried to 
enact a far-reaching economic assistance policy to bolster stability, social reform, and 
reduce the threat of communism in Latin America. In Guatemala the economic effect of 
                                                
104  Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, My War with Communism (Englewood Cliffs, 1963). 
 59 
the Alliances’ assistance was negligible, momentarily stabilizing a weak economy. No 
progress was made towards reform, as conservative elites and the military opposed any 
developments along those lines. The last major goal of the Alliance, to combat 
communism, was successful to a degree. In response to continuing violence and political 
upheaval, the US responded by doing what it had already been doing, providing money 
to bolster the economy and giving military aid and training to combat the political 
upheaval. While the US claimed to be invested in the success of its southern neighbors, 
assistance only came in response to crises. The idealism so strong in Kennedy’s 
speeches was not mirrored in the assistance to Guatemala that only was forthcoming if 
communism or a serious political upheaval was a threat. US assistance during the 
Kennedy administration to Guatemala illuminates a realistic perspective not an idealistic 
one, avoiding involvement unless necessary and then doing as little as possible.   
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CHAPTER III 
PERALTA AZUDRIA AND LYNDON JOHNSON, 1963-1966: MILITARY RULE 
AND THE TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE 
 
 The removal of Ydigoras Fuentes from office was a critical moment for 
Guatemalans, yet the only response from the US was to request a timeline for elections. 
The removal of Ydigoras was perceived by some in Washington as positive. “What has 
happened in Guatemala is that more responsible elements (neither principally nor solely 
conservatives) have made up their minds and taken action to assure their country shall 
not be taken over again by communists.”105 Juan Jose Arevalo’s return to Guatemala to 
participate in elections and his possible ties to communism was of great concern to 
rightist elements in Guatemala as well as Washington. It is interesting that by 1963 the 
Guatemalan military and the right had bought into the Cold War ideology so heavily that 
they overthrew their own government without any encouragement from the United 
States. The ideology of the Cold War served as a useful excuse for the military under the 
direction of Defense Minister Enrique Peralta Azurdia to take control of the government. 
The success of the Guatemalan military in solidifying control over the country was the 
most important factor for the US because it meant greater stability and less need for US 
involvement. The strength of the Guatemalan Right’s stance on terrorism and 
communism appealed to the US despite the military’s illegal seizure of power.106 
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Guatemala was now controlled openly by the military and Enrique Peralta Azurdia until 
1966 when elections were held and Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro became president. 
*** 
 On April 1st soon after the overthrow of Ydigoras, Ambassador Bell wrote to the 
Secretary of State, stating that he “Shared the department’s view we should recognize 
the new government relatively soon and believe it is desirable to recognize it within a 
few days, neither as the first over-eager nation to do so nor as a late and grudging action. 
Essential facts are that this group has taken power effectively; that it did so from an 
honest conviction that such action was required to protect the country from a succession 
of events which would once again lead it into communist control; that it intends to honor 
international commitments; and is eager to receive recognition and seriously determined 
to achieve both honesty and effectiveness in government, including progress toward 
Alianza goals.”107 The decision to support the new government occurred between March 
30th and April 17th. What the previous statement from Ambassador Bell illustrates was 
that the US wanted to remain as neutral as possible; the new regime was in control, was 
anti-communist, and would support US policies in the region. The evidence that the new 
government supported US policy and the Alliance was primarily its agreement to work 
towards elections but in addition to this, the clearly demonstrated commitment against 
communism bolstered this belief. The Alliance issue of progressive reform did not seem 
likely to be developed under the Peralta administration but their commitment to elections 
assured US officials that military rule would be temporary. While Bell’s concerns were 
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by no means identical to the State Department’s list of priorities, it does show what he 
believed to be the most and least important factors of this transition to a new 
Government.  
 The US pro-democracy policy in Latin America has long been exaggerated.108 
Claims of US altruism towards Latin America go back to the Monroe Doctrine, which 
was supposedly protecting Latin American countries from the tyranny of European 
imperialism. The belief that the US was supportive of democracies is an ideal the US 
public liked to believe in and politicians often used this to their advantage but there was 
very little reality behind it. While the Alliance for Progress had the clearly stated goal of 
building democratic institutions, that goal was often ignored for practical concerns. In 
the case of Nicaragua, for example, Kennedy continued to support the Somoza family’s 
dictatorship, and in Argentina, the military frequently interfered in the government, yet 
Alliance aid continued to flow to these countries. These nations were supported despite 
their lack of democracy because they were stable governments. The case of Peru further 
illuminates this issue. Kennedy loudly denounced the Peruvian military coup in 1962, 
but quickly changed his position due to pressure from US businesses, the lack of effect 
his declaration had, and the need to ensure anti-communist support from the Peruvian 
military junta.109 Ideologically the US supported the spread of democracy, yet when the 
issue of regional stability or combating communism appeared, US policy would 
consistently ignore ideological concerns.  
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 While the creation of a military regime in Guatemala once again raised the issue 
of what US policy would be toward military governments in Latin America, the issues of 
stability and cooperation were more important from a US perspective. “At this juncture 
the announced goals of the new government and the enforced lull before the electoral 
campaign is reopened provide an opportunity for constructive US-Guatemalan 
cooperation designed to foster political as well as economic and social development.”110 
The Peralta administrations dissolved the parliament, suspended the constitution, and 
curtailed all political activity; these actions, which were completely counter to US ideals 
of democracy and freedom, were seen as positive by US officials, providing a quiet 
period for constructive political development. The US support of the Peralta regime is 
one of the greatest examples of a disparity between US ideology and action in the case 
of Guatemala. Peralta’s six-point program, which was announced in his address to the 
public following the coup, consisted of 1) eradication of possible extreme government, 
2) government honesty, 3) progressive measure to aid the needy, 4) promotion of 
democracy, 5) respect for international commitments, and 6) the transfer of power to an 
elected official upon the completion of these missions. The State Department report 
discussing this program pointed out that while these seemed to be the usual platitudes of 
a dictator trying to reassure the population, Peralta had taken action to accomplish some 
of these goals. Quickly after taking power Peralta enacted a 48-hour work week and a 
minimum wage law that had been held up in congress; there was also significant 
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conservative public support for his action to stop Arevalo from running for office and 
the new government’s push towards stability.111 
 The importance of elections in US-Guatemalan relations following the coup was 
a vital issue. It was clearly understood by Washington that a military government was 
not a long-term solution, that military regimes were better at removing bad governments 
then they were at building good ones. The need to push for elections was repeated in 
various messages to the US embassy.112 The US balanced the importance of this issue 
against the role of stability and allowed Peralta to delay elections for 2 years; still 
consistent US pressure about elections remained a factor. In contrast to the US focus on 
stability and elections, there was not much discussion on the concrete issues of US aid. 
Following the coup, no large grants were provided or discussed. The possibility of 
supplying the Guatemalan Navy with several patrol ships was discussed, primarily in 
response to a desire to increase surveillance on Cuba.113 The brief period of peace 
immediately after the coup did not last long and an increasing level of guerilla violence 
soon began to cause problems.  
*** 
 It is not surprising that given the coup and the following political upheaval that 
the guerilla movements and anti-government forces tried to take action. Quickly 
following the overthrow of Ydigoras, various anti-government forces capitalized on the 
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confusion. Guerillas already in the northeastern part of the country began taking action 
and spreading leaflets calling for the population to rise in revolt.114 This was 
representative of the Foco style of guerilla war that was exported from Cuba by Che 
Guevara. The Foco theory proposed that small guerilla bands could mobilize and give 
popular dislike of the government a focus through which a mass rebellion could occur. 
Through guerilla attacks by these small bands, the population was supposed to be 
inspired to revolt. This strategy was modeled on the successful Cuban revolution; while 
it would not prove to be a successful strategy in Guatemala; it was still an important 
factor in the development of many insurgencies around the world.115  
 By this time several anti-government groups had developed, the Fuerzas 
Armadas en Rebeldes (FAR) was the radical arm of the Guatemalan communist party. 
The FAR and MR-13 formed the two major guerilla fronts. There were also numerous 
political groups in opposition to the government. There was a strong desire by the 
various anti-government forces to have a joint action, but there was also disagreement 
among them on what strategies they should employ. On May 15 representatives from the 
three major groups met; the communist PGT (which at this time was united with FAR), 
MR-13, and the AEU (Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios). These three groups in 
conference with the Arevalist political faction were all in agreement that the government 
of Guatemala needed to be removed but could not decide on how to accomplish that 
goal. The Arevalist faction wanted to hold off on any offensive movements so that the 
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government would end the state of siege and they would be free to resume actions with 
greater freedom. MR-13 wanted to rob banks in order to fund the purchase of arms and 
supplies and become a more effective military force. In addition, the PGT wanted to 
commence bombing and subversive activities as quickly as possible. The CIA report on 
this meeting said that decisions on a plan of action would be made later, and while these 
groups and other would continue to meet occasionally, they never managed to form a 
united front.116 FAR and the PGT at times were allied, and sometimes MR-13 was also 
united with the other groups, but these periods of cooperation never lasted long, or had 
any serious impact. The biggest weakness of the anti-government forces in Guatemala 
was their lack of unity.117 This did not stop them from taking action, only from taking 
any effective unified action. 
 By the end of 1963, the anti-government factions were on the offensive. MR-13 
had been supplied with weapons through Mexico from Cuba. On December 24th, mortar 
rounds were fired on La Aurora airport. The PGT began several small-scale attacks and 
car bombings in Guatemala City, before the end of the year.118 Military action by these 
factions began to put more pressure on the new regime. The knowledge that Cuba had 
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direct involvement in the growing guerilla problem increased their reputation and the 
fear they inspired. The combination of a new military government whose primary goal 
was to end extremist movements motivated these anti-government groups, creating a 
significantly tenser environment in Guatemala.119 The violence continued to escalate 
until 1966 when there was a brief respite.  
*** 
 Despite tensions that were growing in Guatemala following the coup, US interest 
was focused primarily on issues other than counter-insurgency. The desire to help 
Guatemala create a politically stable and economically successful nation was a top 
priority for the United States. George Balls recommendation was to “Take advantage of 
any opening to draw the Peralta regime toward the realization that its repression of 
political activity only drives it underground, inviting violent subversion, and that regime 
should consider trying to bring politics out into the open and into constructive 
channels.”120 The State Department thought they could really help improve the 
Guatemalan situation by guiding it toward a seemingly more democratic system and 
through economic aid. A civil action report illuminates some of the US actions which the 
embassy perceived as successful; literacy programs, student meal programs, improved 
lifeguards at ports, bridge construction, and distribution of children’s shoes, road 
construction, and medical assistance.121 These were all small-scale operations that had 
no major impact. However, the application of US aid towards infrastructure was a 
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consistent factor which US policy makers thought necessary to help make economic 
improvement possible. 
 A progress report to the Special Group on counter-insurgency, was favorable 
toward internal security, education, labor, and the situation with Belize. The economic 
assessment was neither positive nor negative, stating that while the country was not 
doing poorly, there were no major improvement besides tax reform and the removal of 
some corrupt officials. However the report noted that the honeymoon period briefly 
enjoyed by the Peralta administration was slipping away, due for the most part to harsh 
political repression and the refusal by the government to allow any sort of political 
action, not even a constitutional assembly.122 By October, members of various political 
parties were discussing possible coup attempts. Not even a year after the initial coup, the 
fractured nature of Guatemalan politics had given rise to the possibility of more political 
upheaval.123 Despite the fact that the US in the wake of the Peralta coup emphasized the 
importance of elections, democracy, and economic improvement, the reality of a 
fractured Guatemala resisted any pressure from abroad toward reform. Yet the US 
persisted in maintaining a positive understanding of the new regime and its actions 
despite the lack of movement towards elections and the worsening political tensions. 
 In November of 1963, John F. Kennedy was assassinated, and Lyndon Baines 
Johnson became the President of the United States. This has occasionally been presented 
as a radical turning point in American foreign policy. The public perception of these 
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presidents in particular has encouraged the belief in JFK’s success and LBJ’s failure. 
Kennedy was loved internationally for his policies, particularly in Latin America, 
whereas Johnson has been generally despised for his escalation of the Vietnam War.124  
Johnson was most notably associated with his domestic agenda “the great society,” yet 
on several occasions he illustrated his commitment to continuing Kennedy’s policies in 
Latin America. At a White House reception for Latin American representatives on 
November 26, 1963 Johnson reaffirmed his commitment to the Alliance for Progress and 
stated that relations within the western hemisphere would be “among the highest 
concerns of my government.”125  
 During Johnson’s administration several important situations developed in Latin 
America that he had to deal with, notably the Dominican crisis, riots in Panama, and the 
military coup in Brazil. In May of 1965, 20,000 US troops landed in the Dominican 
Republic in order to put an end to a movement against Reid Cabral who had taken power 
from the democratically elected president Juan Bosch in 1962. The Kennedy 
administration had supported Cabral’s take over and Johnson justified this armed 
intervention by claiming that the movement to return Bosch to power was communist 
inspired, despite any such evidence of a connection. Johnson emphasized that that he 
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would not allow another Cuba.126 A similar situation to the 1963 coup in the Dominican 
Republic developed in Brazil. The legitimate president of Brazil Joao Goulart was 
deposed in a military coup. Goulart was the vice president and came to the office of 
president through a complicated series of political deals, following the previous 
president Janio da Silva Quadro’s sudden resignation. The military perceived his 
attempted reforms as a socialist threat and proceeded to force him out of the country by 
taking control of major cities. By April 1, it was apparent to Goulart that he no longer 
had any support and fled to the countryside finally fleeing the country on April 4th; in 
his place, a military regime took control and would remain in power until the 1980’s. 
The Johnson administration supported the military in their coup attempt and were 
prepared to supply fuel and ammunition should a civil war break out.127 US support for 
the Brazilian military coup and support of the Cabral administration are two clear 
examples of US Cold War fears dictating the actions of American foreign policy during 
the Johnson administration.  
 After Lyndon Johnson took the office of president he sought to improve the 
Alliance for Progress, which had been bogged down in bureaucracy. To this end, he 
appointed Thomas Mann as assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, special 
assistant to the president and coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. There was a great 
deal of criticism against Mann from former members of the Kennedy administration. He 
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was blamed for killing the Alliance and for altering the Alliance significantly with the 
Mann doctrine. This doctrine differentiated Alliance policy between Kennedy and 
Johnson. Mann thought that through increasing stability in Latin America, economies 
would develop and communism would be less likely. This was in opposition to 
Kennedy’s Alliance which first sought to improve Latin economies and social 
institutions, which in turn would result in more stable nations. Many theorists saw this 
emphasis on stability over social and economic improvement as a major divergence and 
betrayal of the Alliances progressive ideals.128 Yet, as noted above, John F. Kennedy had 
supported the Peralta administration in order to increase stability in the region, ignoring 
his goal of social improvement. While Johnson and Mann were more blunt about the 
goals and purpose of the Alliance, their policy actions were similar to and motivated by 
the same rationale as Kennedy’s.  
*** 
 By early 1964, guerilla activities in Guatemala had begun to escalate. A 
significant portion of guerilla activity was still taking place in the Zacapa, Izabal, and 
Petén regions of Guatemala. This traditional rural guerilla strategy consisted of small 
bands attacking government outposts or patrols in rural Guatemala. The area North West 
of Lake Izabal in the Sierra de Las Minas was where these rural guerilla forces 
maintained their bases, and at this time their forces were small, consisting of maybe 100 
men,129 compared to about 500 or so, with maybe another 500 part-time supporters at the 
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guerilla’s most powerful point in 1966. The encounters between government forces and 
guerillas were primarily hit-and-run attacks; at this point Guatemalan intelligence was 
not good enough to plan and execute any serious attacks on guerilla forces as their 
locations were unknown. An example of a standard engagement between these two 
forces during this period took place on July 22 in the Alta Verapaz region near the 
Mexican border. Thirty to forty guerillas ambushed a patrol from the Puerto Barrios 
area. By the time the army patrol took the position from which they were receiving fire, 
they only found deserted ammunition, rations, and bloodstains. The guerillas had fled 
and crossed over the border.130 In this case, the hit and run tactics of the guerillas were 
only moderately effective, resulting in a few casualties, but it is representative of how 
the rural guerilla front was fighting the government. The MR-13 continued to be the 
main proponent of the rural strategy, whereas FAR began to focus more on urban 
operations. 
 The alternative to a rural guerilla front began to emerge during 1964, an urban 
insurgency. This type of combat was characterized by bombings, attacks on police, and 
was generally focused on attacking infrastructure or causing terror in major cities. On 
January 24 Colonel Oliva, an intelligence officer in Puerto Barrios and his son were 
killed in a drive-by shooting.131 Further mortar attacks on the airport in Guatemala City 
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and the Guardia de Honor brigade headquarters illustrate the growing guerilla emphasis 
on urban targets. While these attacks were only moderately effective, the attack on the 
brigade headquarters did take out a transformer and cause blackouts in part of the city.132 
While the move towards an urban insurgency originated with the FAR and the PGT, all 
the anti-government factions would eventually use this strategy to some degree. More 
than any increased action in rural Guatemala, the growth of an urban insurgency marked 
the spread of a deadly conflict, which influenced the lives of more Guatemalan civilians.  
*** 
 Civilian political participation was not something that Guatemalan society was 
very familiar with; its long series of dictators had not allowed the social institutions of 
democracy to develop and those that had formed during the “ten years of spring” had 
quickly been crushed by the Castillo Armas and Ydigoras regimes. The one exception to 
this was the “Huelga de Dolores,” which literally translates as Strike of Pain; it was an 
annual parade commemorating student protests. In 1898 Manuel Estrada Cabrera 
became the ruler of Guatemala and early on allowed some liberal freedoms, this was 
taken advantage of by students and faculty at the college of medicine at the University of 
San Carlos who started the “Huelga de Dolores” in 1898 to pressure the government to 
improve the education system. This grew into a broader cultural institution celebrating 
civilian protest. While it remained predominantly a student-driven event, the “Huelga” 
developed an important societal role, allowing the people of Guatemala an outlet for 
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their frustrations with the government. Despite its origins as a protest, by the 1960’s the 
“Huelga” had also become a celebration and parade.133 
 The “Huelga” had not been held since 1960 when the MR-13 rebellion forced the 
government to crack down on political expression; in March 1964 the first “Huelga de 
Dolores” in three years was held. In the politically charged atmosphere of Cold War 
Guatemala, the “Huelga” took on serious political implications. US and Guatemalan 
officials feared extremist demonstrations or acts of terrorism; this was also the first time 
the Peralta administration dealt with student protests. In order to combat the possible 
riots or violence spawned by the protest, the Border Patrol put 320 instead of 80 men on 
the streets of Guatemala City, the National Police doubled their patrol numbers, and the 
Judicial police were placed on standby;134 these forces were also given the order to use 
extreme force at the slightest provocation.135 Despite government fears, student apathy 
and fear reduced the “Huelga” to a muted affair; the only damages were caused by the 
poor crowd control of Guatemalan police.136 Nevertheless, this event signaled a change 
in Guatemalan society, after this event more criticism of the military regime in power 
began to emerge, not just from extremists but also from the political center. The “Huelga 
de Dolores” in 1964 did not cause major disruptions within Guatemala, but the fact that 
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it was allowed to happened at all was an important lessening of political oppression by 
the Peralta administration. The loosening of control on the populace eventually led to the 
military regime being pressured into holding elections in 1966.  
*** 
 Guerrilla actions and student demonstrations were not the only things the Peralta 
government had to worry about, internal political division once again almost brought 
about another coup. On May 24th 1964, the Guatemalan constituent assembly was 
supposed to have its first elections since Ydigoras was overthrown. The eligible 
population of each department voted on its representatives to the assembly. There 
however were only two parties on the ballot, the MLN (National Liberation Movement) 
a rightist party, and the PR (Revolutionary Party) a center left party. These two parties 
were allowed because at this time, the PR was the most moderate party and the MLN 
had significant support from the conservative elite and could not be ignored. Both parties 
were also willing to work with the military. The situation in Guatemala dictated that the 
only avenue to even partial political power was through the acceptance of the reality that 
the military was in control and joining in a coalition with them was the only way to win 
seats in the assembly. The PR itself, however, was barely tolerated by the extreme right, 
which continued to loudly voice their opposition to this party. This coalition did not last 
long but it illustrates the fluidity of Guatemalan political lines, which were consistently 
changing. The other leftist parties did not bother attempting to register because they 
were sure they would be denied. Rightist parties were also excluded, the MDN (National 
Democratic Movement) led by Jose Luis Cruz Salazar was declared ineligible because of 
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its ties with the previous president Ydigoras. The candidates from the MLN and PR were 
all selected by the military and no opposition parties were allowed. If you were not 
willing to support the military coalition you were not going to be involved in the 
government.137  
 This rather blatant co-option of elections to serve the military coalition in power 
did not go over well. According to CIA intelligence, a national front consisting of leftists 
and rightists with the backing of the air force was believed to have formed in opposition 
to the Peralta government and its interference in the election of an assembly. Despite 
significant planning and military backing this coup never materialized, and the 
constituent assembly, set up by Peralta, went unchallenged.138 This conspiracy illustrates 
the weakening of the Peralta government, which had begun with a strong position 
supported by the military and the right. However, by the end of 1964 that support had 
already begun to disappear. The lack of progress towards elections and the military 
domination of politics severely hurt any legitimacy that the Peralta regime had. 
*** 
 The US assessment of the situation in Guatemala at the end of 1964 was 
remarkably naive. “A majority of the population apparently supports, or is at least 
neutral toward the present government of Col. Peralta, in part because of its 
demonstration of comparatively honest and orderly administration and its steps thus far 
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toward a return to constitutionality.”139 This sentiment expressed by Assistant Secretary 
Thomas Mann in an internal defense progress report, completely ignored the fact that 
elements of an urban insurgency were beginning to develop in Guatemala, that coup 
attempts were being plotted against the military government, and the only steps towards 
constitutionality that had been taken were in the form of a rigged election. While the 
issue of insurgency and political instability were mentioned later in the report, it is clear 
they continued to be perceived as relatively minor issues that would be addressed and 
fixed in good time. This naive sentiment was also mirrored in the report of Ambassador 
Bell on the same subject. Bell ascribed particular importance to the Guatemalan 
Government’s attempts to form a unified political party, the PID (Institutional 
Democratic Party), by uniting the PR and the MLN with the Military coalition.140 It is 
difficult to understand how creating a system with one party that dominated the 
government could be seen as a step toward constitutionality.  
 The US perspective on Guatemala’s development of democracy was clearly 
misguided but their assessment of the insurgent situation and the Guatemalan ability to 
deal with it were accurate. No increased aid or new programs to aid the Guatemalan 
military were underway by the end of 1964. As far as the US was concerned the guerilla 
problem remained localized in the northeast, and the Guatemalan forces were judged to 
be capable of dealing with the problem over time.141 There was still fear of Cuban 
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involvement, just no serious evidence of any Cuban action except for the training of 
some guerillas in Cuba the previous year and the supply of some weapons.142 While the 
US thought that the Guatemalan military was in control of the guerilla situation, there 
was still doubt about the ability of the police to be effective; it was regularly stated in 
reports that police training and equipment was not being used effectively. By 1965 the 
US still perceived the Peralta regime as a step forward for Guatemalan stability; the 
closer the country got to having an election that façade the US believed in would become 
harder and harder to believe in as the political divisions in Guatemala became more 
apparent.  
*** 
 Near the end of 1964 Ambassador Bell was positive that the multi-party coalition 
behind the new state party, the PID, would be a positive force for the stability of 
Guatemala. That he was mistaken was clear by February 24th 1965 when the government 
of Guatemala declared a state of siege in order to postpone elections because the military 
could not decide on a candidate. The problem of political fragmentation became a big 
enough issue by January of 1965 that it was noted in a report to the Secretary of State. 
The inability of the various factions within the military to pick a candidate to run for 
president broke up the PID coalition from within. This division and weakness within the 
military half of the PID encouraged the MLN and PR to drop out of the coalition.143 The 
approach of presidential elections created a tense political atmosphere. Every faction 
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was attempting to work towards the goal of its representative being allowed to run in the 
election that was set for September 15th. This growing political competition shattered 
any hope the military had of its PID party taking control. And so the state of siege was 
declared and the elections postponed. Previous declarations of siege had been as a result 
of sudden massive political disturbances, like the original MR-13 rebellion, or the coup 
that overthrew Ydigoras. However, in this case the state of siege, which was very similar 
to declaring martial law in that it temporarily suspended several individual freedoms and 
gave the government more power, had a purely political motivation.144 A press 
conference of Peralta’s several months after the declaration, mentioned a vague plot 
against the government and the usual problems with guerillas and communists.145 It was 
clear even to the embassy, which supported Peralta, that there was no sufficient cause for 
the declaration except for political purposes.  
 The state of siege and surrounding political unrest gave rise to more guerilla 
violence. Subversive activity was on the rise, and anti-government forces were using two 
new strategies in 1965. A new focus on attacking US installations and personnel in 
Guatemala began to develop. Insurgents also began to kidnap wealthy people in order to 
raise money and spread terror. This was even more successful. The PGT began making 
threats against US personnel and installations, and planning bombings. On February 10th 
Col. Houser the chief of the US army mission came under fire while driving in 
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Guatemala City, the second attack on US personnel in six weeks.146 CIA intelligence 
claimed that these actions were in response to the US involvement in the Dominican 
Republic.147 The US responded by increasing the guards at the embassy, and ensuring 
that all personnel working in the field were dressed in civilian clothes. The US was 
aware of three major kidnappings during 1965 and it was very likely that more people 
were taken than were reported to have been. A wealthy shop owner, a young lawyer 
belonging to a “good family,” and a banker were all kidnapped, and their ransom was 
paid to various insurgent elements.148 Both FAR and the PGT were involved in 
kidnappings, and both organizations profited from the significant influx of capital that 
came from these hostage situations, from $60,000 to 1$00,000 dollars per person.149 This 
strategy also severely demoralized the wealthy and middle-class population of 
Guatemala, spreading fear and terror.150 Kidnapping was not only effective against the 
population; it weakened Peralta’s position significantly. The growth of kidnappings gave 
the political right like the MLN and other conservative elites the excuse they needed to 
apply more pressure on the Peralta regime and bring it very close to collapse.151 
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 The Peralta regime was once again under the threat of a coup, this time organized 
by the former MLN presidential candidate Miguel Angel Ponciano. The combination of 
the successful kidnapping strategy and Ponciano’s personal hatred of Peralta inspired 
this plot. “They (MLN) are clearly highly bitter against chief of government and 
personalize all present difficulties in terms of what they call his stupidity, incompetence, 
and stubbornness.”152 It is important to realize that in the relatively small community 
that comprised the Guatemalan elite, there were tensions that did not necessarily have 
anything to do with policy or politics. Despite these pressures on the government of 
Guatemala, Peralta Azurdia and Ambassador Mein were both very confident in the 
government’s ability to maintain power. There were fears from higher in the State 
Department. A memorandum from William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council 
to Mr. Bundy, the special assistant to the President for national security affairs, 
illustrates that other representative of the US were very worried about the possibility of a 
coup. Mr. Bowdler wanted to push for an OAS presence in Guatemala. Mein refused to 
broach the subject with Peralta, ensuring Bowdler that Peralta would not want outside 
interference and that the government was secure. Despite the clearly fraudulent assembly 
elections in May of 1964 Mein still did not want to go against Peralta’s wishes.153 This 
incident illuminated how members of the US diplomatic community within a country 
were more sympathetic to the aims and perspectives of the government they were 
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dealing with. Ambassador Mein and previously Ambassador Bell consistently were more 
sympathetic to Guatemalan desires then US officials in Washington.  
 It would be easy to just emphasize the challenges facing the Peralta 
administration by the end of 1965, but his administration was successful in combating 
the guerillas’ previous strategies by this point. While the government had not adjusted to 
deal with the kidnappings, Operations Limpieza and Jabali illustrate the growing 
sophistication and ability of the Guatemalan military. Operation Jabali was a weeklong 
operation conducted by the Zacapa brigade. The Guatemalan military managed to 
successfully search the countryside. They killed 23 guerillas and took another 25 
suspects prisoner.154 This marks a significant improvement in the success of government 
patrols, which up to this point had received equal or significant loses after encountering 
guerillas while on patrol. In addition to this successful rural action, the military’s ability 
to deal with an urban insurgency began to develop. Operation Limpieza was focused on 
cordoning off a section of the city with known insurgent activity and weeding out the 
enemy. The realization that the National police did not have significant manpower to 
manage urban areas led to their cooperation with the Judicial police and the US in 
planning operations. While this operation was not as marked a success as the rural 
campaign it was significant because of how the government forces were learning and 
adapting to combat the threat of urban war.155  
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 Both these new strategies’ success relied heavily on the new intelligence 
gathering capabilities that the US was developing, and the better organization that was 
being instituted through US assistance. The US instituted centralized intelligence 
gathering operations which enabled the rural forces to have a better idea where to find 
their targets, and the previously disorganized and unprofessional police forces relied on 
new cooperative skills taught them by the US to manage large urban operations. These 
two operations illustrated that there was some merit to the idea that the Peralta regime 
would be able to hold on to its position, however the political environment in Guatemala 
was still firmly against Peralta and it was only a matter of time until elections had to be 
held.  
 The PR underwent an important change that affected the stability of Guatemala. 
Mario Mendez Montenegro, the longtime leader of the party and its presidential 
candidate, was shot in November of 1965, and his brother Julio Cesar Mendez 
Montenegro assumed his place in the party leadership. Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro 
had not been involved in politics since he withdrew from the profession in protest 
following the murder of Colonel Arana in 1949. He served in a variety of positions 
under the Arevalo administration, and since his withdrawal from politics he had been 
practicing law and serving as the dean of the law school at San Carlos University.156 He 
was perceived as an intelligent and capable individual, but the US was still concerned 
about his ability to manage the party without recent experience. This upheaval in the 
most stable and politically acceptable leftist party also worried the US. The possibility 
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that the murder of Mario Montenegro was a political assassination created the fear that 
the PR would radicalize in response. Julio Mendez Montenegro was in a difficult 
position, forced to balance the sudden increase in political support from the left in 
response to his brother’s murder without causing the MLN or the PID to fear the growth 
of support by the left.157  
*** 
 During the Peralta years, the US influence in Guatemala developed significantly. 
Two of the major developments were the posting of a new ambassador and the arrival of 
US public safety advisor John P. Longan. Ambassador John G. Mein was a relatively 
typical representative of the State Department; he went to college at George Washington 
University and had done graduate work at American University. He was appointed to the 
Foreign Service in 1942 and served in posts at Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Oslo, and Djakarta. 
He did not stand out as representing any particular US perspective on Latin America, but  
he had received the meritorious service award for his work on Indonesian affairs where 
very similar issues to those in Guatemala faced US diplomats.158 On September 3 1965, 
John Mein became the US Ambassador to Guatemala.159 
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 On November 24th 1965 Ambassador Mein received a request from Chief of 
State Peralta requesting expert assistance in advising Guatemalan law enforcement on 
techniques to combat kidnapping and extortion.160 This request was promptly sent to the 
State Department. John Longan, a public safety advisor stationed in Caracas, Venezuela 
was sent to Guatemala to assess the situation along with Pete Costello who took over the 
public safety section of AID.161 Longan’s role in Guatemala has often been portrayed in 
a very negative light. Out of all the public safety advisors and US military personnel 
stationed in Guatemala, he has been singled out as the person most responsible for 
training the Guatemalan military in brutal counter-insurgency tactics. Greg Grandin in 
particular claims that he trained an elite unit. “In March 1966 four months after 
Longan’s training, it kidnapped, tortured, and executed as many as thirty people.”162 Yet, 
Grandin does not mention the name of this unit or cite any sources for this 
information.163 While Longan did train and organize the Guatemalan military in order to 
help them to better respond to urban terror threats, there is no evidence to say that he 
taught Guatemalans to murder and torture.  
 Every regime since the 1954 coup incorporated political oppression, including 
the unwarranted imprisonment and sometimes murder of political rivals or opposition. It 
is unfair to blame Longan for Guatemala’s violent counter terror policies when the main 
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issues he was concerned with and reported on were organizational. In his official 
assessment of the Guatemalan situation he had three clear recommendations: that police 
agencies had to start working together, that this process should be coordinated from the 
upper levels of Guatemalan government, and that police actions and raids on suspect 
areas in Guatemala City should start immediately. The last major recommendation was 
to centralize intelligence gathering so that all information would go to one location 
where it could be analyzed and acted on.164 Nowhere in that report did he recommend 
torture or murder, and there is no mention of his training a particular unit. Longan was 
singled out as the inspiration behind Guatemalan terror tactics, yet in this case he did 
little more than recommend a better police organization, something US advisors had 
been proposing since 1956. 
 The emphasis of US policy on topics other than military assistance should be 
clear. There was more US attention to the subject of police training and efficiency, than 
there was on military training. The Public Safety Program was a component of the 
Alliance for Progress that received significant funding and had a larger impact on 
Guatemala. Despite its lofty title this program focused mainly on creating an efficient 
and modern police force in Guatemala, and most of the recommendations for funding 
dealt with improving organization and maintaining equipment.165 US aid to the 
Guatemalan police force came in the form of supplies as well as training. Other authors 
often emphasize the supply of small arms, tear gas, and other riot control equipment as 
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examples of US support for harsh military police action. Yet the supply of revolvers to 
equip a police force is clearly different from providing napalm to the military. US 
assistance consistently focused on avoiding excessive violence. US officials even 
commented that by giving the police pistols it ensured they didn’t use machine guns 
instead.166 The overall goal of training police forces was to create a more professional, 
modern, and less violent method of law enforcement.  
 Another key factor behind US actions in Guatemala was a growing awareness by 
the US public of the situation there. Several specials on network television highlighted 
the events happening in Guatemala and emphasized the role of US involvement. Several 
news articles also received enough attention to be discussed in diplomatic circles. The 
US government was very concerned about how the public perceived its actions abroad. 
A report from the State Department to the embassy pointed out that the NBC program 
“The Science of Spying” intimated a strong US involvement in Guatemala. That the 
State Department thought this important enough to inform the embassy shows the US 
government’s caution when it came to how its actions abroad were perceived.167 In July 
of 1966, the acting Secretary of State wrote a letter to Thomas Miglautsch, the vice 
chairman of the Wisconsin governor’s Committee on Human Rights, in response to a 
letter questioning issues of US involvement in Guatemala following an NBC 
documentary “The Undeclared War.” This letter assured Mr. Miglautsch that the 
program provided a more dramatic picture of issues in Guatemala and that the US was 
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firmly committed to aiding Guatemala through the Alliance for Progress to gain a stable 
democracy.168 The fact that the State Department was worried about how US 
involvement was being portrayed on television illuminates its desire to maintain a 
neutral position in the public’s eyes. This awareness of public opinion did not have a 
profound impact on US Guatemalan relations during the 1960’s, but as the crisis in 
Guatemala continued it would receive more attention abroad. What should be noted is 
that US policy was aware of possible negative attention and wanted to avoid it.  
*** 
 From 1963 to 1966 Guatemala had a military government that supported the US, 
fought against Communism, and claimed to be working towards open elections and 
democracy. During those three years the Guatemalan Government slowly inched 
towards elections reluctantly, and focused a great deal of attention on combating several 
guerilla insurgencies. The military government was employing a holding action, not 
really moving forward or backwards, just attempting to maintain the status quo. The US 
mimicked this in their relations with Guatemala even though there were significant 
changes within the US foreign policy apparatus. The US policy towards Latin America 
and Guatemala remained the same. The amount of funding remained consistent, 
diplomatic communications continued to emphasize the same issues, and the overall US 
perspective towards Latin America remained the same.  
  Developments in Guatemala did not have a huge impact on US foreign policy, 
instead illustrating a consistent level of interest and involvement. While Johnson’s 
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National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) #297 was far clearer and more specific 
than Kennedy’s on Latin American military aid, it was not radically different. Whereas 
Kennedy in NSAM #2 made a quick statement to focus attention on Latin American 
military aid, Johnsons NSAM #297 examined in detail what kind of aid should be given, 
and included information about encouraging democratic behavior from Latin American 
countries. He presented seven general objectives; among those were the maintenance of 
a realistic military establishment, an emphasis on civic action and internal security 
missions, avoidance of sophisticated prestige equipment like jet aircraft, and “Emphasis 
in training and by other means on the role of the military in a modern democratic 
society.”169 The emphasis on realistic military establishment and prestige equipment 
illustrates Johnson’s desire to help Latin American nations build better militaries but 
only to the point necessary to fight internal communist insurgencies. There was a focus 
on the role of the military in a democratic society, implying that Johnson was more 
focused on ensuring that the military power did not destroy democratic institutions. It is 
apparent that the LBJ administration was concerned with the region’s ability to maintain 
democratic governments while providing internal security against the threat of 
Communism. The key dissimilarity in Johnson’s policy was the lack of emphasis on 
counter-guerilla or counter-terrorist training and operations. This shift in focus was not 
only in Latin America, but also in Vietnam, and within the military organization, itself 
much of the Special Forces organizational apparatus that Kennedy created began to 
decline after his death. While this major component of Kennedy’s strategy for Latin 
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America was less important to this administration, the emphasis on internal defense and 
conversely police training continued to be a central issue. Combating communist 
insurgencies continued to worry the US, but the ineffectiveness of guerilla movements 
encouraged policy makers and shifted focus away from them.170  
 The situation was further complicated by the only significant change in US 
policy, which was to not support any new regime changes in Guatemala. Despite the 
decision to support the Peralta administration after they seized power, the US informed 
Ponciano that they would not support him seizing power. Ambassador to Panama Mr. 
Vaughn in a communication with ambassador Mein advised “you should make clear to 
him (Ponciano) that the US would not find it easy to cooperate with a Guatemalan 
government that was the result of a coup.”171 Mr. Mein did follow up on this advice 
making it clear to the MLN by 1966 that the United States would not support another 
coup. What had changed between the Peralta coup and 1966 to discourage US approval? 
The Peralta regime was showing some signs of success and the US was convinced that 
democracy would be forthcoming. While both Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
maintained similar policies toward Guatemala, and the overall objective of stability 
remained central.  
 What about the economic aid? Again there was consistency between these two 
administrations, and the State Department’s distant position is clear in the amount and 
type of aid provided. Johnson’s economic aid to Guatemala had more time to fluctuate, 
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so there was a strikingly low figure, $3.8 million dollars of aid in 1966. Yet, his high of 
$78.9 million dollars in 1969 was three times as much as Kennedy’s highest number. 
Part of the reason for that high figure though was the intensity of the internal conflict in 
Guatemala after 1966, which motivated a greater deal of aid.172 The fact is that the 
Johnson administration, just like the Kennedy one, realized that the path to stability in 
Guatemala and Latin America as a whole would come from stable economies.173 More 
funds were put into AID then MAP at any time in 1960’s Guatemala. The emphasis in 
works like Black’s Garrison Guatemala and Joana’s The Battle for Guatemala is on the 
military material support and training that go to Guatemala, yet total annual aid never 
was more than three million dollars. The US training teams in Guatemala are often 
mentioned as a key factor in training the government counter-insurgency forces to be the 
most efficient in the isthmus; for any given year, however, there were only two such 
units in the country. There were consistently more US units working to train supply and 
maintenance personnel in the Guatemalan military, as many as seven in 1967.174   
 Despite the interest in military development in Guatemala, the Johnson 
administration’s economic aid was remarkably consistent from 1963 to 1966. Every year 
except 1966, the US provided economic assistance, of about $13 million dollars. In 
1966, the aid fell to about $9 million dollars, but this lower figure can be explained by 
the uncertainty over the Guatemalan elections and whether the new government would 
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prove to be stable.175 There are several key differences in Johnson’s aid to Guatemala; 
his administration provided fewer Ex-Im bank loans with only $4.3 million during his 
first three years. He consistently provided more funds for the Inter-American highway, 
with $4.8 million dollars in his first three years as compared to Kennedys $1.5 million. 
The aid he provided for the Peace Corps remained consistent after the initial investment 
of $1.2 million in 1963, half a million dollars was provided each year after that. The 
department of agriculture provided $5 million dollars total aid over three years, twice as 
much as the previous administration.176 What Johnson did differently when it came to 
providing aid to Guatemala was that he provided a wider variety of assistance directed at 
more problems. Kennedy provided most of his administrations aid in large lump sum 
grants or loans directly to the government itself. While neither of these aid strategies was 
wrong or right, in the end neither was effective at stabilizing Guatemala. So there were 
some divisions in how these two administrations addressed the issue of Guatemalan aid 
but they were on a more technical level, while larger goals remained the same.  
*** 
 Guatemala was changing. Pressure from various political elements against the 
administration, and pressure from the US was pushing the country toward elections. 
Head of state Peralta Azurdia chose the date for elections, March 6th 1966. “Guatemala 
was heading into another political crisis. The ingredients are all too familiar in Latin 
America: a small conservative oligarchy exercising economic and military power 
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confronts a reformist political opposition enjoying wide but ill-organized support from 
an impoverished electorate. We believe that a military coup, either before or shortly after 
the elections, is likely.”177 This CIA assessment concisely lays out the problem, that 
Peralta was on his way out and the alternatives were not attractive to the conservative 
elite who held most of the power in Guatemala. Due to the popularity of the PR as the 
only leftist political option and the likelihood of Mendez Montenegro being elected, the 
US was concerned. This fear was based on the events of the previous coup in 1963 
which occurred because of the possible election of a politician from the left. It seemed to 
the US that events were about to repeat themselves. The question remained, would 
Guatemala have free, legitimate elections, and if so would there be a coup when Mendez 
Montenegro won?178 Despite US and Guatemalan fears of instability, the country moved 
forward and presidential elections took place.  
The strong fear that the populace on the right or the left would not accept the 
results if Mendez Montenegro were elected, or if the PID remained in power, left the US 
planning for every eventuality and expecting the worst. Juan Dios Aguilar, the PID 
candidate, could not win the election without arousing suspicion of fraud or government 
impropriety. The MLN candidate Colonel Ponciano ran on a firmly anti-communist 
ticket, the opposite of Mendez Montenegro who, while being on the moderate left, was 
still perceived by the MLN as a precursor to Communism. “Each is unacceptable, 
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personally or ideologically, to at least one important segment of society.”179 Despite 
these tensions the elections occurred in a legitimate manner and on July 1, Mendez 
Montenegro and his Vice President Clemente Marroquin Rojas were elected.  
 The structure of the Guatemalan electoral system reveals the relative validity of 
the 1966 election. The Guatemalan elections were democratic in form, the right and 
obligation to vote was granted to all literate citizens over the age of 18, and was optional 
for those who were illiterate. Members of the armed forces, police officers, and the 
mentally disabled were barred from voting. A secret ballot was used and there were 
precautions in place to prevent plural voting.180 In addition to this system, the fact that 
the PR won the election was a positive sign that relatively free elections had occurred 
even though many political parties could not participate. The military government of 
Azurdia Peralta briefly imprisoned Mendez Montenegro’s brother after it seized power, 
and the PR was disliked by rightist elements of Guatemalan society, yet it was still 
allowed to participate despite this history of animosity, implying a significant level of 
legitimacy. According to an assessment of the elections 44% of the votes went to the PR 
party. The growth of urbanization in Guatemala allowed the PR party to appeal to the 
newly urban masses and their desires for reform. This popular position combined with 
the dislike of the state run PID and elitist nature of the MLN won the PR a plurality at 
the polls.181  
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 There is also a strong argument against the validity of the 1966 election, 
“Fraudulent elections would be no surprise. Mendez Montenegro of the PR recently has 
professed that if the fraud is not obvious he will abide by the results. Ponciano of the 
MLN probably will also.”182 No situation in which the principal candidates of the 
election were willing to accept fraud can be seen as the optimal environment for 
democracy. In addition to this willingness of the candidates to allow fraud, it was 
necessary for the members of the PR, PID, and military to sign an agreement that would 
allow the PR to take power following their success in the election. Secret deals are not 
how legitimate democracies operate. An important component of this agreement was 
that the military would nominate the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the new 
government had to agree to continue fighting communists and the guerilla threat.183 
These elections were clearly not legitimate by the standards of western democracies, but 
given the limits imposed by the military it was probably as close as they could have 
come to democracy. 
 While the procedure of the elections was legitimate and Mendez Montenegro did 
represent a majority of the population, the Guatemalan military still held on to a 
significant amount of power behind the scenes. It was only through their good graces 
that Mendez Montenegro was allowed to take office. Despite the not so pristine nature of 
the new democratic government, the new administration appeared to have the support of 
a plurality of the people, and the military was willing to tolerate it, so the US declared 
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the March elections a victory for democracy. This election would be the last relatively 
legitimate democratic process in Guatemala until the mid-1980’s. Mendez Montenegro 
winning the election began a new phase of US-Guatemalan relations, in which the US 
treated the new government as legitimate, putting an end to the suspicion and pressure 
that had been directed at the Peralta regime and ushering in a period when the US 
believed that Guatemala had the ability to improve as a nation.184   
                                                
184 NSA 00278, Memo for LBJ, “Electoral Picture in Guatemala,” April, 5, 1966. 
 97 
CHAPTER IV 
MENDEZ MONTENEGRO AND LYNDON JOHNSON, 1966-1969: THE 
EMERGENCE OF COUNTER TERROR 
 
 As a result of the 1966 elections, the political situation in Guatemala once again 
changed. A political party of the center left came to power through seemingly legitimate 
elections, and the military had given up its control to a new civilian government. This 
development had a profound impact on the extreme right, and further radicalized that 
element of Guatemalan society. The election of Mendez Montenegro was supposed to 
represent a Guatemalan return to democracy and constitutionality. However, the early 
years of his administration would involve violence from the right and left that would 
foreshadow the extreme violence of the 1980’s. On the surface, it appeared that the 
situation in Guatemala was improving, but the country was in reality moving further 
towards repression and violence.  
*** 
 Reactions to the election varied across the political spectrum. Immediately 
following the 1966 election, the Guatemalan right responded by putting pressure on 
Enrique Peralta Azurdia to annul the elections or step down so someone else could.185 
The victory of the PR (Partido Revolucionario) party motivated this move against the 
established order by the right. The MLN (Movimiento Liberacion Nacional) thought that 
the PR was a dangerously leftist group. In reality the PR party was clearly closer to the 
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center with the PGT and guerillas on the far left. Despite the moderate reality of PR 
politics, the MLN began plotting to remove the new president by any means necessary. 
The MLN worked on plans with ranking military officers and tried to contact the heads 
of other nations like Honduras and Nicaragua, all in order to combat the growing 
communist threat supposedly presented by the PR. While the MLN certainly considered 
the PR a leftist threat, the long-standing divisions in Guatemalan society and the 
animosity between these two groups should also be taken into account when determining 
the motivations behind the MLN actions. The other important action taken by the MLN 
in response to the 1966 elections was the formation of a civilian terrorist organization 
known as Mano Blanco (The White Hand). This organization was developed to oppose 
the new government and to terrorize communists and their sympathizers. During 1966, 
this organization focused on psychological warfare, harassing people and exploding a 
few bombs.186 The organization would change and develop into a far more brutal and 
deadly extension of rightist policies as the decade continued.  
 Mendez Montenegro in his inaugural address offered the hand of peace to the 
communist guerillas and terrorists, asking them to cease hostilities and work with the 
new government. He continued by saying that if the guerillas perceived his offer of 
peace as a sign of weakness, his hand of peace would become a mailed fist.187 From the 
moment his presidency began Mendez Montenegro was put in the position of trying to 
balance the extremes of Guatemalan society; he had to appease the hardliners on the 
right and try to bring a peaceful conclusion to the guerilla violence. Moreover, while 
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appeasing the two diametrically opposite political groups in Guatemala, he had to work 
towards the reforms the country desperately needed. He started out strong with a good 
speech but encountered problems quickly, and spent his first 100 days in office trying to 
organize the government, get it staffed, and create a budget.188 While these were all 
important issues to address and important to building a more stable Guatemala it led to 
him being criticized as a do nothing, and gave the MLN the excuse they needed to 
continue plotting against his administration. Despite the slower pace with which his 
administration developed, Mendez Montenegro was trying to make progress and remain 
in power despite pressure from the right and left. “Mendez in his energetic, at times 
angry radio/TV address on September 7 did much to restore public confidence. He 
berated those who were impatient with his democratic (and therefore slower) procedures, 
and threatened to act against subversives on both political extremes.”189 He managed to 
maintain a modicum of stability in the early days of his administration by appeasing and 
threatening both ends of the political spectrum. However this careful balance did not 
last. By June, both FAR and MR-13 had refused the peace offer and in response to a 
growing wave of violence, Mendez Montenegro suspended constitutional guarantees and 
began a new campaign against the guerillas.190  
 Prior to the election of Mendez Montenegro the Peralta administration was 
involved in forcefully repressing any communist opposition. This included arrests and 
also presumably executions. In response to a series of disappearances in March of 1966, 
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the FAR kidnapped Information Secretary Baltazar Morales and Supreme Court 
President Augusto de Leon and demanded the return of 28 missing PGT officials. The 
Peralta administration declared a state of siege in response to these kidnappings. 191 
Despite these worsening tensions between guerilla forces and the Peralta government, 
the election and following inauguration happened without interruption from the far left. 
After Mendez Montenegro’s inaugural address, the guerilla forces ceased hostilities in 
order to wait and see what the right would do in response to the election. Their general 
plan centered on the belief that the MLN or the military would intervene to stop the PR 
from taking power. Such a coup would have given the guerillas a significant boost in 
public opinion and support, allowing them to start their operations again from a more 
powerful position.192 When no coup occurred and it was apparent that they would have 
to deal with the Mendez Montenegro government, the guerilla forces declared their 
intentions. In a joint statement on July 16 the FAR and PGT declared that “the new 
Guatemalan government is under the tutelage of North American imperialism, and FAR 
will give new impetus to its politico-military struggle for the Guatemalan revolution.” 193 
Yon Sosa’s response reaffirmed MR-13’s armed struggle, stating “to the death with 
capitalism,” 194 and rejected the peace offer. While the far left did not immediately 
oppose the new government, after it became clear that no new advantages could be 
gained from the new situation, they soon reverted to the strategy they were accustomed 
to and continued to fight a guerilla war against the government of Guatemala. Despite 
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the more moderate government of Mendez Montenegro, the far left still believed the 
only chance for real change lay in a revolution.  
*** 
The election and subsequent political reactions were not the only important 
events that occurred in 1966. On the international front the Havana Tricontinental 
conference took place in January. This was a meeting of revolutionary leaders from 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America to discuss their struggles against imperialism and plan 
future action. This conference developed out of the national liberation movements of 
Africa and Asia, growing to include Latin America creating the OSPAAAL 
(organizacion de solidaridad con los pueblos de asia, africa y america latina, 
organization of solidarity with the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America) at the 
Havana conference. While this organization was ostensibly about addressing 
imperialism, it was also seen as an extension of the Soviet and communist expansionist 
policy.195 It illuminated some of the clear divisions, which had developed between 
communist countries. The conference was representative of Cuba’s increasing desire and 
willingness to be involved in spreading revolution to other countries, a policy that 
brought it into conflict with its benefactor, the Soviet Union. The Soviets were trying to 
calm tensions with the US and build ties with Latin American countries. Cuba and its 
representative, Che Guevara, were spreading revolution in Africa and Latin America. By 
the end of the year, Che was in Bolivia. Despite that venture’s eventual failure this 
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conference illuminated Cuba’s commitment to revolution and the major communist 
power’s lack of commitment to the third world.196 As with most political meetings the 
primary purpose of this conference was to talk, no actions were directly planned but 
ideology was shared and the spread of revolution was encouraged. The Tricontinental 
conference also had a direct connection to people and events in Guatemala.   
During the Tricontinental conference Guatemala’s leftist revolution garnered 
public international attention from its communist supporters for the first time. Luis 
Augusto Trucios Lima, the commander of FAR, attended the Tricontinental conference. 
Fidel Castro’s ties to the Guatemalan guerillas were made very clear in his final address 
to the conference, which was very positive towards FAR. Castro commented that 
Trucios Lima had saved the revolution in Guatemala and extolled his leadership abilities. 
However, in that same address, he openly criticized Yon Sosa and MR-13, claiming that 
the organization had been taken over by Trotskyite elements.197 That speech, combined 
with the fact that Yon Sosa had not been invited to the conference, showed that Castro 
clearly favored FAR and had no intention of giving any more aid to MR-13. This 
conference marked the final split between these two guerilla groups, who had been 
trying to work together on and off for most of the decade. After MR-13 lost the support 
of Cuba, the already weakening guerilla force continued to decline and eventually ceased 
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to exist as a viable force in Guatemala.198 FAR was at the forefront of Communist 
revolutions in the region yet their success would not last long. 
A series of deaths in the political structure of the far left severely damaged their 
position in Guatemala. Victor Manuel Gutierrez Garbin, the head of the PGT, returned to 
Guatemala in order to work towards a legalization of his party and to support 
government reform. He was arrested and died while being tortured by the police.199 This 
motivated a large upwelling of support against the government but left the PGT without 
one of its longtime leaders. In addition, Trucios Lima died in a car accident on October 
2nd, leaving FAR temporarily without a leader and giving the government a morale boost 
because Trucios had been one of the most feared and respected guerilla leaders. Julio 
Cesar Macias, also known as Cesar Montes, took over as leader of the organization after 
Trucios Lima’s death.200 The FAR started a new wave of violence in November of 
1966.201 Several fuel tanks for the power company Empresa Electrica were destroyed in 
the culminating action of this growing wave of terrorism. This pressure from the left, 
combined with a growing number of bombings, murders and political propaganda by the 
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MLN, motivated the Mendez Montenegro government to declare its first state of 
siege,202 as mentioned begore.  
The last major development of 1966 was the emergence of campesinos (rural 
farmers) as a political and military force. Terrorists on the left and right spread violence 
throughout rural Guatemala. In addition to political terrorism, crime and violence for 
personal gain increased and had a large impact in rural areas. In response to the growing 
crime and violence, campesinos began to demonstrate and protest for peace. A large 
group of campesinos was involved in a protest on December 4th and shortly thereafter, 
the president, in conjunction with the minister of defense, authorized the rural authorities 
to carry arms in self-defense.203 This marked the beginning of a popular mobilization in 
rural Guatemala and the campesinos as a result were at the forefront of rural violence. 
Instead of helping stabilize the Guatemalan countryside, arming sections of the populace 
led to more violence.  
*** 
The military response to these developments was important. As has been 
illustrated time and again in Guatemala, the military was the most powerful political 
entity. Despite doubts about whether the military would allow the new administration to 
take power, events proceeded in a fairly democratic manner. In spite of the upheaval that 
developed in the first year of the new administration, the military continued to support 
the government and its actions. The reality was that Mendez Montenegro was very much 
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aware that he had to maintain a good relationship with the military. There was no overt 
control by the military of the new administration. However, the defense minister’s 
involvement in the declaration of a state of siege, the arming of campesinos, and the 
further development of police and counter-insurgency forces illustrated that the 
government was taking into account the military’s perspective and desires.204 The 
Mendez Montenegro regime brought its full power to bear against violent rightist group 
sponsored by the MLN and the extreme left; in doing so, it reassured the military that 
their goal was stability.  
While the Guatemalan military was satisfied with the way events were 
developing, the United States were still waiting to see how things would develop and 
were not convinced that Mendez Montenegro was doing a good job. The “monthly 
guerilla report” for November 1966 shows that the US understood how bad things were 
becoming in Guatemala. It contained a list of terrorist incidents for the month, almost 
every day a violent incident occurred with as many as six incidents in a day. 
Furthermore, these were just the events the US knew about; there were undoubtedly 
many unreported occurrences of leftist violence.205 The general assessment of Mendez 
Montenegro after the election was fairly cautious. The CIA determined that his ability to 
remain in office would depend on whether he maintained good relations with the 
military, assuming that in order to remain in power he would have to forego any major 
reforms. Finally the report concluded that it was doubtful he would be able survive in 
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office over the next two years. “His administration’s chances for accomplishing much, 
either in reform or in significant economic growth and development will, depend heavily 
upon whether it accepts substantial outside assistance -with its attendant obligations- and 
uses it effectively.”206 The last line about outside assistance illustrates the US 
perspective that the Guatemalan Government needed the US if it hoped to continue 
functioning. The US understood the inherently weak position Mendez Montenegro was 
in, surrounded on the left and right by extremists while being forced by political 
necessity to work with the military; the US would work to stabilize the nation with more 
economic and military assistance. 
*** 
 1967 was an interesting year for Guatemala. There was no one important event or 
development. Instead, the culmination of a decade of political division and violence took 
shape. In addition to the resurgence of leftist guerilla action, government and rightist 
terror groups began to have a significant impact on society. This was reflected in the 
discussions of some American officials who, while continuing to emphasize eliminating 
the guerilla threat, demonstrated an awarenes of the threat from the right.207 The 
situation in Guatemala created a problem for US policy. The desire to aid a government 
they were allied with against the threat of collapse from internal conflict clashed with the 
possibility that the biggest threat to the Guatemalan government was not from the 
                                                
206  State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 South and Central America; 
Mexico, ed. Edward C. Keefer, David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler, Vol. XXXI (Washington DC, 
2004), CIA National Intelligence Estimate, “prospects for stability in Guatemala,” June/24/1966, P.209-
210. 
207 Ibid, memorandum from the director of the office of Central American Affairs to the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs, October/12/1967, P.225.  
 107 
communists but from the anti-communist forces. In addition to extreme rightists, the 
government of Guatemala also became heavily involved in the increasing violence. “In 
recent months the largest number of killings in Guatemala have been carried out by 
clandestine elements of GOG (government of Guatemala) security forces with the 
approval or at least tacit permission of the President.”208 US policy was thus confronted 
with the challenge of how to adapt to the growth of government-sponsored violence.  
The complicated nature of the Guatemalan counter-terror program that was 
emerging was difficult for US officials to understand. A majority of US personnel, both 
in Washington and in the embassy, were in favor of continued assistance. At the same 
time there were others questioning basic assumptions about the Mendez Montenegro 
regime: was it even in power and to what degree? The following statement illustrates a 
more radical assessment of the situation in Guatemala. “CIA appears to feel more 
strongly than we do at this time with respect to certain threatening aspects of the 
Guatemalan situation. The agency in recent briefings for key officials of the US 
government has stated that President Mendez Montenegro of Guatemala has abdicated 
all power to the military and is himself in the hands of extreme rightists.”209 The CIA 
thought that the government of Guatemala was completely compromised; this presents a 
sharp contrast to the following statement, which was in a memorandum from Walt 
Rostow to President Johnson. “Mendez Montenegro has tackled the insurgency problem 
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with energy and has accomplished a good deal. He has welcomed our assistance and we 
have responded with additional help on the military and police side. Our present 
programs look about right. A modest increase in our rural police program is warranted 
and Covey Oliver (Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs and US 
coordinator of the Alliance for Progress) will pursue this.”210 These statements represent 
two completely contrary assessments of the situation in Guatemala by US government 
officials. One claimed the Government under Mendez Montenegro was doing well, the 
other that he had lost power completely. Yet, despite doubts about who was in control of 
the country, US policy remained consistent and focused on helping the government of 
Guatemala combat the leftist guerilla insurgency.  
The US continued to operate in Guatemala while largely ignoring the issue of 
counter-terror. Nowhere is this clearer than in the records of US assistance from 1967. 
The total economic assistance for 1967 rose from $9 million to $14 million dollars, and 
the total military assistance rose from $1.46 million to $2.17 million dollars.211 The US 
made no attempt to alter its foreign policy or take into account the issue of rightist terror 
or government violence. On several occasions, embassy officials acknowledged the 
possible negative effects of continued clandestine counter terror efforts by the 
government212 but that understanding never quite made it to the upper echelons of the 
US government. Those few that were worried about conditions in Guatemala like Viron 
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P. Vaky the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, were not able to 
convince others that the traditional concerns about guerillas were less important in 
Guatemala than the escalating right-wing violence. “It shows what a democratic, popular 
government can do when it is determined to take firm action.”213 The previous statement 
by Walt Rostow in regards to a report on Mendez Montenegro’s success illustrates the 
disconnect between the understanding of the situation by many of those officials in 
Washington. The description of the Mendez Montenegro administration as a purely 
democratic institution and the fact that violent counter-terror was ignored shows US 
policy makers not understanding key elements of what was happening in Guatemala. US 
foreign policy did not accurately address the situation in Guatemala. This difficulty in 
understanding what was happening is best explained by the complicated nature of the 
counter-terror program and Guatemalan society as a whole.  
*** 
 The rightist non-governmental terrorists and government-sponsored counter-
terrorism began to have a serious impact on Guatemala by 1967. Who these groups 
were, how they operated, and developed deserves a more complete examination. The 
organization known as Mano Blanco generally receives a great deal of attention as the 
most well-known rightist terror group. Yet a closer examination of events reveals that 
this emphasis is misplaced, at least during the 1960’s. Mano Blanco originally developed 
as a terrorist group to oppose the Mendez Montenegro regime; it branched out into 
further terrorizing the population as a whole and in particular those elements of society 
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who were perceived as leftist or communist. Their actions against members of the PR 
worried the Mendez Montenegro administration and posed a serious threat to the 
stability of the party in control of the government, but their role in the violence of the 
1960’s should not be overemphasized.214 Mano was very good at propaganda and was 
very successful in convincing many segments of the population that a great deal of 
terrorist actions against the left were being perpetrated by Mano. While this organization 
would continue to have a role in the future of the Guatemalan conflict, it is important to 
note that they were not as powerful as they first appear. Military counter-terror groups in 
an effort to spread fear and disguise those involved, created several fictitious groups 
upon which acts of violence were blamed. Groups like the NAO (New Anti Communist 
organization), MAG (Guatemalan Anti Communist Movement), and RAYO (The 
Thunderbolt) were cover names for clandestine army commando units, which served as 
execution squads. Mano was often lumped in with these groups and received credit for 
their actions. Ambassador Mein referred to these anti-communist organizations as 
alphabet soup organizations, implying that they were a successful obfuscation of who 
was behind the terrorism.215 This did not last long and it soon became clear to the US 
embassy and the Guatemalan public that the military was behind the new terrorism. “It 
appears only MANO ever really existed as an independent organization free of army 
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control. The other organizations are apparently only cover for clandestine army 
commando units which serve as armed forces execution squads.” 216  
 The Guatemalan military was given carte blanche to act against the leftist 
guerillas after Mendez Montenegro’s peace offer was declined. This resulted in two new 
strategies to combat the guerillas. Campesinos began to be armed, and the Special 
Commando Unit of the Guatemalan Army (SCUGA) began carrying out kidnappings, 
torture, and executions in the guise of civilian terrorist groups.217 The most dramatic of 
these two strategies was clearly the actions of SCUGA. The complete illegality and 
brutality of this army organization’s assault on the citizens of Guatemala was shocking. 
Under the command of Colonel Maximo Zepeda, this unit, at times working with the 
fourth corps of the national police, took action against communists real and alleged as 
well as “enemies of the state.” This unit operated in more urban areas whereas the armed 
campesinos in the Zacapa and Izabal region were under the command of Colonel Arana 
Osorio. Known as “Operation Guatemala” this part of the counter-terror operation was 
less centralized but still employed the same brutal tactics on a more diffuse scale 
throughout the countryside. In particular, this rural campaign was successful in eroding 
the local leadership throughout the countryside.218 Death counts vary significantly yet it 
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is clear that the Guatemalan government during the Mendez Montenegro administration 
was responsible for the deaths of close to 1,000 of its citizens, possibly more.219 
 The details of the Guatemalan counter-terror campaign are unclear at best, just as 
the details of the guerilla operations are clouded by the unreliability of sources and the 
nature of these secretive organizations. It is impossible to make any concrete claims 
about these groups based solely upon the information that US officials had. Yet, the 
larger implication of the growing terror in Guatemala was that the administration of 
Mendez Montenegro was weakening. Numerous State Department communications were 
bringing up the question of whether Mendez Montenegro would be able to stop the 
counter terror when necessary and how much longer the Guatemalan people would put 
up with the violence. US officials described what was happening in Guatemala as a 
“creeping coup.”220 The military was gaining more power, and the legitimate 
government was giving up its control gradually to satisfy the demands of the 
conservative elites. A rather telling remark was made to William Newlin, a political 
officer, in an interview with several prominent Guatemalans; Newlin commented that 
the anti-communist forces had not eliminated any of the well known PGT big shots. The 
reply was “one of the keys to all of Guatemalan politics. The big shots are ‘your 
neighbors and ours in zone 10’ big – really big – lawyers, etc., and at least someone’s 
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son-in-law. Who, they asked smiling, would dare touch them?”221 The implication is that 
in Guatemala politics was so intertwined with elite factions and other ties as to be 
indistinguishable. It is important to remember that this was not a straightforward 
political struggle; it was an internal clashing of forces trying to grab for more power. 
Thus, the pressure against Mendez Montenegro to continue allowing the military free 
reign clashed with cautious recommendations from the US embassy to curb the counter-
terror forces. He remained trapped between the two factions and was unable to work 
towards any lessening of tensions.222 
*** 
 On January 16th 1968, two US military personnel in Guatemala were 
assassinated, Colonel John Webber Jr., the commander of the US Guatemala Military 
Group, and Lt. commander Ernest Monroe. Their car was hit with machine gun fire from 
several members of FAR. “The communists have now ‘broken the ice’ on assassinations 
of US personnel in Latin America”223 The ice was indeed broken; on August 28th 
Ambassador Mein was assassinated. While driving north on the Avenida Reforma, the 
ambassador’s car was cut off in front by a green Chevelle and boxed in from the rear by 
a red Toyota. Three men forced the ambassador and his chauffeur from their car and 
tried to drag off the ambassador. He broke loose, tried to run, and was gunned down. 
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The FAR claimed responsibility for the assassination, stating that it was in reprisal for 
the illegal imprisonment of Carlos Francisco Ordonez Monteguado.224 This assassination 
influenced the US to perceive the guerilla problem as a more serious threat to 
Guatemalan stability, and significantly shook the confidence of diplomatic officials in 
their own personal safety. Yet the real importance of these two assassinations is that they 
represent a last gasp of the Guatemalan extreme left against the overwhelming force of 
the government counter terror program.  
 By 1968, US military intelligence estimated that MR-13 had no more then 20 
active members and that FAR had been reduced to 125 fulltime activists with several 
hundred supporters.225 While neither of these guerilla groups had been completely 
defeated, their support networks and ability to successfully carry out large-scale 
coordinated operations had been effectively neutralized. The assassination of US 
personnel was part of an increased emphasis on urban insurgency by the guerillas 
because they had become so ineffective in rural areas.226 The government terror 
operations were successful in doing significant damage to these two organizations. MR-
13 would disband after Yon Sosa was killed in Mexico in 1970. And FAR would lose 
the ability to mount any substantive action as the decade came to a close. Without 
political or popular support these guerilla groups could not continue fighting. The terror 
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campaign successfully made it impossible for anyone to support the guerillas; if they 
did, they were killed, tortured, or imprisoned. With a deterrent like that it was not 
surprising that the guerilla movements lost the support they needed to continue 
functioning. This victory was not complete or permanent but after 1968, leftist guerilla 
action and government counter-terror declined. 
 For most of his presidency Mendez Montenegro was not in firm control of what 
the military was doing. But in March of 1968, he dismissed the Minister of Defense 
Arriaga Bosque, the head of Zacapa operations Arana Osorio, and the commander of the 
honor guard.227 This marks one of the only times in Guatemalan history where the 
military was challenged by civilian authority. The removal of these officers was 
motivated by the desire to curb the violence being produced by the counter-terror 
operations. That Arana Osorio was removed and Mendez Montenegro ordered the 
civilian militias in the Zacapa, Izabal regions to be disarmed points towards this fact.228 
While Mendez Montenegro managed to avoid any serious backlash from the military, he 
was still in a position where he had to keep the conservative elements happy, and was 
not able to work toward any significant reforms. Despite the serious doubts of most 
observers, Mendez Montenegro remained president for his entire term. His successor, 
however, was Colonel Arana Osorio, himself who would be the first of a series of 
presidents from the military. Yet Mendez Montenegro still left the legacy of having for a 
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short while calmed the violence in Guatemala and asserted, however briefly, civilian 
authority over the military.  
*** 
 President Johnson in a cabinet meeting following his return from a weekend trip 
to Central America said “I would say there is no problem in Central America that money 
and resources cannot cure. But the problems are many, and they are great. There is a 
great deal to do in education, in health, in housing, in transportation, and 
communication. When all these problems are solved we can expect to see a better life for 
all the people of this hemisphere, and we can expect to see greatly expanded trade 
between our country and all of these nations.”229 This quote illustrates that on the 
uppermost level of US politics, the status quo had been maintained. John F. Kennedy 
could have just as easily made this statement; the primary goal of helping Central 
America economically and politically remained consistent under the Johnson 
administration. That help was tempered by the desire to increase trade and fight the 
spread of communism, just as it was under Kennedy. Johnson’s focus continued to 
center on the economic arena; later that year in NSAM (national security action 
memorandum) #371; he stated “At my recent meeting with the Presidents of Central 
America we agreed on the critical importance of accelerating growth and diversification 
of exports from Central American countries to both US and third country markets.”230 
While on the surface, US policy was clear, the case of Guatemala was made more 
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complicated by the continuing difficulties in the country. This created differing 
strategies within lower levels of the US foreign policy apparatus, yet both Kennedy and 
Johnson focused on trying to create a more stable nation of Guatemala, without 
demonstrating an understanding of the nations fundamental problems. 
 While the presidents’ position on US policy towards Central America was clear, 
there remained considerable disagreement between various lower-level policy makers. 
At the 37th senior interdepartmental group meeting on May 16, 1968, the various 
assessments of the Guatemalan situation were discussed as well as recommendations for 
action. Ambassador Mein summarized the analysis and proposal of the country team, 
which saw Mendez Montenegro as the most preferable option in Guatemala and wanted 
to continue with the current strategy, as it was ensuring he remained in power and not 
threatening his position. Assistant Secretary Covey T. Oliver reported that the IRG/ 
ARA (interdepartmental regional group /Bureau of inter-American affairs) had 
determined that it was necessary to offer increased assistance and pressure Mendez 
Montenegro to make a serious attempt at reform.231 The emphasis on pressuring Mendez 
Montenegro towards reform originated in the fact “that there had recently been 
considerable criticism in the United States press concerning repressive measures by the 
Guatemalan government and our apparent association with them.”232 Furthermore, 
Mendez Montenegro’s action in removing the military leaders convinced this meeting 
that he had the capacity to work towards reform. These differences in policy stem from 
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how the situation was understood. Some US officials like Viron Vaky saw how 
complicated the issues were. “The point is that the society is being rent apart and 
polarized; emotions, desire for revenge and personal bitterness are being sucked in; the 
pure communist issue is thus blurred; and issues of poverty and social injustice are being 
converted into virulent questions of outraged emotion and ‘tyranny.’ The whole 
cumulative impact is mostly unhealthy.”233 Others like Ambassador Mein simplified 
things and focused on the issues they understood. “The insurgency situation has been 
one of our great concerns in Guatemala, and many of our actions and programs have 
been directed specifically at getting the government to move and then in supporting it 
once it began its counter-insurgency actions.”234 Despite these differences in perspective 
the decision of the senior interdepartmental group meeting would be enacted; Mendez 
Montenegro was pressured to work towards reforms. While being given $70 million 
dollars in US loans in 1969. And the United States would continue along this course 
trying to nudge Guatemala towards a viable future through economic assistance, but 
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refusing to understand the deep divisions in Guatemalan society that were stopping any 
possibility of development.  
*** 
 In 1966 in response to the election of a politically center left president the 
Guatemalan right and political elite became more radicalized and resorted to terrorism, 
while at the same time the extreme left and revolutionary guerillas began to increase 
their own terrorist operations in response to the new wave of violence from the right. 
The precarious political position of Mendez Montenegro forced him to give the military 
carte blanche to act against the guerillas and terrorists. From 1966 to 1968, the 
democratically elected president of Guatemala allowed counter-terrorist forces led by 
elements of the government’s military to terrorize the population. The tide of violence 
was stemmed when President Mendez Montenegro once again asserted control over the 
military, but a successful precedent of utilizing violent government-sponsored terrorism 
to control an insurgency had been established. Despite the further disintegration of law 
and order in Guatemala, US foreign policy leaders continued to see the Mendez 
Montenegro administration in a positive light, and tried to work towards the established 
goal of regional stability and economic improvement. While a guerilla insurgency was 





 US Cold War foreign policy had a powerful impact on the nation of Guatemala. 
From the 1954 coup sponsored by the CIA onwards, the fate of these two nations was 
intertwined. During the Kennedy administration the Alliance for Progress was created, 
and he also implemented military assistance programs in order to train Latin American 
nations to fight off the threat of communism, both of which were inspired by the 
successful Cuban revolution led by Fidel Castro that transformed a friendly neighbor 
into the monster that was Communist expansion. Through a perspective heavily 
influenced by the Cuban revolution, the US saw the MR-13 rebellion and other incidents 
of Guatemalan domestic unrest as part of the larger struggle between capitalism and 
communism that was the Cold War. In response to the instability within Guatemala, the 
US focused on providing significant economic aid, while simultaneously working with 
the Guatemalan police and military to create more effective internal security forces 
capable of combating Communist subversion. Despite US attempts to foster stability, in 
1963 President Ydigoras was removed from office by a military coup. 
 Defense Minister Enrique Peralta Azurdia took control of Guatemala following 
the coup, and the Kennedy administration quickly recognized the new government. The 
US understanding of the situation was that despite the lack of constitutionality behind 
Peralta’s government, it was fighting communism and it was willing to work with the 
US. The Johnson administration continued to support the Guatemalan government and 
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continued to provide economic and military assistance. The economic assistance 
included loans, funding for various progressive social programs, and infrastructure 
improvement. The military assistance continued to focus on creating more efficient 
police, and a better intelligence network. Despite US assistance, the internal social and 
political divisions in Guatemala resulted in increased violence. In the midst of the 
escalating violence, elections were held in 1966 and Mendez Montenegro of the 
moderate left Partido Revolucionario was elected president and was allowed to take 
office by the military.  
 The election of a politically left president further radicalized the Guatemalan 
right, resulting in attempted coups and terrorism. The violence from the leftist guerillas 
and the right forced Mendez Montenegro to allow the military to use whatever means 
necessary to bring the country under control. As a result government-sponsored counter-
terrorism units began to murder, kidnap, and torture suspected communists or threats to 
the government. This violence resulted in close to 1,000 deaths and the further collapse 
of order within Guatemala. In 1968, President Mendez removed several military officers 
from their posts and reasserted civilian control over the government. Throughout this 
period of chaos, US policy continued to support the Guatemalan government. While 
analysts were aware of the violence and disorder within Guatemala, policy makers 
continued to see the US role as aiding the government to build its economy and combat 
communism. US policy towards Guatemala was extremely optimistic, emphasizing the 
success of the Mendez government against the guerillas and the possibility for reform. 
While the US consistently tried to help Guatemala build a better future, its policy 
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ignored the biggest problem facing the nation. The Alliance for Progress tried to address 
economic issues, and social reform, but those in power in Guatemala rejected reform. 
 What you should take away from this was the depth and complexity of events in 
Guatemala. Nothing about Guatemala during this period was simple; the emphasis on the 
study of the Guatemalan Civil war needs to shift away from trying to understand it as a 
40 year period. The previous attempts at historical analyses fail to take into account the 
details of how the situation developed. In the rush to explain the horrors of the genocide 
in the 1980’s, it is easy to forget to explain how things got so bad. The growth of 
violence from the left and right did not happen overnight. There are also clear 
distinctions between the violence of the 1960’s and 1980’s. During the 1960’s leftist 
guerillas were operating in eastern Guatemala without popular support. While in the 
1980’s there was significant indigenous involvement and the conflict was focused on 
north-western Guatemala. Also military control of the country developed slowly, 
Ydigoras government was clearly distinct from the military, yet following the Peralta 
coup the military gradually increased their control over the country. But this process was 
not uniform, as Mendez Montenegro’s reigning in of the counter-terror illustrates. These 
major developments were driven by internal political struggles and illuminate the 
distinctions that separate the 1960’s from the larger struggles of the Cold War, which 
framed these events. 
 The US consistently viewed Guatemala through the lens of the Cold War, unable 
to understand the complex motivations involved in the Guatemalan situation. Despite a 
series of events ranging from a military coup, rural guerilla insurgency, elections, and 
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counter-terror operation, the foreign policy of the United States focused consistently on 
creating greater stability, improving economic conditions, and combating the spread of 
communism. Despite the need for a policy tailored to the specific challenges that were 
present in Guatemala, US aid did not evolve. Even under multiple US administrations, 
that policy remained consistent with only a few minor alterations, between Johnson and 
Kennedy. This static policy if more representative of US policy in Latin America then 
the many examples provided by “more important countries.” While US policy did not 
change, the situation in Guatemala would continue to evolve.  
 Mendez Montenegro did finish his term in office, but the following presidents 
were all military men the extreme right. In the 1970’s, the guerilla insurgency and 
conversely the counter-insurgency would wax and wane. But by the early 1980’s, a 
terror program against the indigenous Maya population reached new levels of violence. 
While these events were not direct reactions to what happened in the 1960’s the 
relationship is clear. The successful application of counter-terror as a tool to quell 
guerilla forces also inspired a future generation of military leaders to employ it, for their 
own ends. There were however some positive legacies of the 1960’s. The administration 
of Mendez Montenegro illustrated that a civilian leader could lead the country, and in 
1985 a civilian leader would once again hold the office of president. While this period of 
US-Guatemalan relations represents no major victories for the US, it does illustrate that 
the role of the US in training Guatemalan forces has been greatly exaggerated. The 
reality was that US training was more focused on the mundane issues of maintenance 
and organization rather then counter-terror and torture.  
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 The start of Guatemala’s problems, the 1954 coup, was clearly the result of Cold 
War tensions, yet the troubles continued because of internal divisions. While from 
America’s perspective the Cold War was the most important issue for its foreign policy 
to address, in Guatemala national politics used Cold War ideology and rhetoric for their 
own ends. This study presents an example of the complicated interplay between US 
foreign policy and national political developments. The United States’ failed attempts to 
stabilize and improve conditions in Guatemala further illuminates the issues which have 
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in millions, historical $US 
Source: US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook] 
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/index.html 
 
Program or account 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 _2009D0 
Economic Assistance, Total 7.30 21.40 9.60 13.30 9.30 13.20 9.00 14.10 16.50 8.60 140.04 
USAID and Predecessor, Total 6.30 21.00 4.60 3.30 5.80 7.30 4.10 11.50 11.20 5.60 43.06 
      Economic Support 
Fund/Security Support Assistance 
. . . . . . . 1.10 . 0.30 7.33 
            Economic Support Fund, 
USAID 
. . . . . . . 1.10 . 0.30 7.33 
      Development Assistance . . . . . . . . . . 29.30 
            Development Assistance, 
USAID 
. . . . . . . . . . 29.30 
      Other USAID Assistance 6.30 21.00 4.60 3.30 5.80 7.30 4.10 10.40 11.20 5.30 6.43 
            USAID Loans 3.50 7.50 . 0.70 2.70 5.00 1.60 8.00 8.60 2.10 . 
            USAID Grants 2.80 13.50 4.60 2.60 3.10 2.30 2.50 3.50 2.60 3.50 . 
            Operating Expenses of the 
USAID 
. . . . . . . . . . 4.88 
            International Disaster and 
Famine Assistance, USAID 
. . . . . . . . . . 1.29 
            Foreign National 
Employees Separation Liability 
Fund, USAID 
. . . . . . . . . . 0.26 
Department of Agriculture, Total 0.30 0.40 0.70 1.00 3.00 1.10 0.90 1.90 1.90 2.20 36.88 
      Food Aid, Total 0.30 0.40 0.70 1.00 3.00 1.10 0.90 1.90 1.90 2.20 36.88 
      Title I . . . . . . . . . . 6.60 
            Public Law 480 Program 
Account [Title I Programs] 
. . . . . . . . . . 6.60 
      Title II 0.30 0.40 0.70 1.00 3.00 1.10 0.90 1.90 1.90 2.20 23.82 
            Public Law 480 Grants 
[Title II] 
0.30 0.40 0.70 1.00 3.00 1.10 0.90 1.90 1.90 2.20 23.82 
      Food For Education . . . . . . . . . . 6.46 
            McGovern-Dole 
International Food for Education 
and Child Nutrition Program 
Grants 
. . . . . . . . . . 6.46 
State Department, Total . . . . . . . . . . 39.00 
      Global Health and Child 
Survival 
. . . . . . . . . . 14.12 
            Global Health and Child 
Survival, Department of State 
. . . . . . . . . . 14.12 
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Program or account 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 _2009D0 
      Narcotics Control . . . . . . . . . . 24.30 
            International Narcotics 
Control and Law Enforcement 
. . . . . . . . . . 11.31 
            Andean Counterdrug 
Initiative, Department of State 
. . . . . . . . . . 12.99 
      Other State Assistance . . . . . . . . . . 0.58 
            Educational and Cultural 
Exchange Programs, Department 
of State 
. . . . . . . . . . 0.07 
            National Endowment for 
Democracy, Department of State 
. . . . . . . . . . 0.51 
Other Economic Assistance, Total 0.70 . 4.30 9.00 0.50 4.80 4.00 0.70 3.40 0.80 21.09 
      Peace Corps . . 0.00 1.20 0.50 0.60 0.40 0.70 0.70 0.60 4.41 
            Peace Corps . . 0.00 1.20 0.50 0.60 0.40 0.70 0.70 0.60 4.41 
      Department of Defense 
Security Assistance 
. . . . . . . . . . 2.48 
            Drug Interdiction and 
Counter-Drug Activities, Defense 
. . . . . . . . . . 2.48 
      Other Active Grant Programs . . . . . . . . . . 14.21 
            Trade and Development 
Agency 
. . . . . . . . . . 0.51 
            International Affairs 
Technical Assistance, Department 
of Treasury 
. . . . . . . . . . 1.39 
            Inter-American Foundation . . . . . . . . . . 0.03 
            Multinational Species 
Conservation Fund, United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service 
. . . . . . . . . . 0.07 
            Neotropical Migratory Bird 
Conservation, United States Fish 
and Wildlife Service 
. . . . . . . . . . 0.03 
            Salaries and Expenses, 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives 
. . . . . . . . . . 0.59 
            Salaries and Expenses, 
Departmental Management, 
Department of Labor 
. . . . . . . . . . 4.20 
            Disease Control, Research, 
and Training, Centers for Disease 
Control 
. . . . . . . . . . 7.33 
            Salaries and Expenses, 
Food and Drug Administration 
. . . . . . . . . . 0.01 
            Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation, Department of 
Energy 
. . . . . . . . . . 0.06 
      Inactive Programs 0.70 . 4.30 7.80 . 4.20 3.60 0.00 2.70 0.20 . 
            Social Progress Trust Fund 
(Loans) 
. . 3.50 7.80 . 3.00 . . . . . 
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Program or account 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 _2009D0 
            Binational Center Loans . . . . . . . . . 0.10 . 
            Inter-American Highway 0.70 . 0.80 . . 1.20 3.60 0.00 2.70 0.10 . 
Military Assistance, Total 0.57 0.11 3.65 2.90 2.74 1.57 1.46 2.17 1.13 2.43 0.75 
            Other Military Grants . . . 0.30 . . . . . . . 
            Military Assistance 
Program (MAP) Grants 
0.16 0.04 2.18 1.30 1.33 0.78 0.99 1.74 0.73 1.60 . 
            International Military 
Education and Training 
0.40 0.07 1.17 0.10 0.51 0.49 0.27 0.33 0.30 0.23 0.25 
            Foreign Military Financing 
Program 
. . . . . . . . . . 0.50 
            Transfer from Excess Stock 0.00 0.00 0.30 1.20 0.90 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.20 . 
            Foreign Military Financing, 
Direct Loan Program Account 
. . . . . . . . . 0.40 . 
Economic and Military Assistance, 
Total 







      Non-Concessional U.S. Loans, 
Total 
1.70 10.50 . . 4.30 . . 1.80 1.00 70.0
0 
35.00 
            All Other US Government 
Loans and Grants 
. . . . . . . . 1.00 . . 
      Export-Import Bank Loans 1.70 10.50 . . 4.30 . . 1.80 . 70.0
0 
. 
            Export-Import Bank Loans 
Program Account 
1.70 10.50 . . 4.30 . . 1.80 . 70.0
0 
. 
      OPIC and Other Non-
Concessional U.S. Loans 
. . . . . . . . 1.00 . 35.00 
            Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, Direct 
Loan Financing Account 



















Monthly Guerilla Report- November 
From US Guatemalan Embassy 
 NSA 00326, Guatemalan embassy telegram, “monthly guerilla report November,” December/17/1966. The 
following is a list of terrorist incidents that happened during the month of November. This list helps better understand 
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